Supreme Court of Canada prefers approach to statutory interpretation is that set out by E. A. Driedger:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament[1].
The modern approach recognizes the important role that context must inevitably play when a court construes the written words of a statute. It is undoubted that words take their colour from their surroundings[2]I will examine this second factor of the modern approach in three steps. First, I will scrutinize the immediate context of the impugned words: the provision in which the words appear and any closely related provisions. Second, I will follow with an inquiry into the broader context of the section, i.e., the Act as a whole to determine the intention of the legislator. Finally, I will review the external context, that is the historical settings in which a particular provision has been was enacted.[3]
Simon of Glaisdale in Maunsell v Olins[4] drew a distinction between the different audiences that the legislation is aimed at:
“It is sometimes put that, in statutes dealing with ordinary people in their everyday lives, the language is presumed to be used in its primary ordinary sense, unless this stultifies the purpose of the statute, or otherwise produces some injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, in which case some secondary ordinary sense may be preferred, so as to obviate the injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, or fulfil the purpose of the statute: while in statutes dealing with technical matters, words which are capable of both bearing an ordinary meaning and being terms of art in the technical matter of the legislation will presumptively bear their primary meaning as such terms of art (or, if they must necessarily be modified, some secondary meaning as terms of art.”
This analysis brings us on to the in interpreting the modern rules of construction Lord question whether the intention of Parliament can only be gleaned from the current rules of construction, which are a mixture of a literal and purposive interpretation,[5] or, whether the courts need the assistance of extrinsic aids to determine the intention of Parliament.
[1] (See Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, at p. 578, per Estey J. (taxation); Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, at p. 1134, per Dickson C.J. (administrative); Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21, per Iacobucci J. (employment); R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 33, per McLachlin C.J. (criminal); R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, 2001 SCC 56, at para. 28, per Iacobucci J. (admiralty); Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3, at para. 27, per Iacobucci J. (immigration); Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26, per Iacobucci J. (radiocommunication).)
[2] Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42;
[3] Cited from:Marche v. Halifax Insurance Co., 2005 SCC 6, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 47
[4][1975] AC 373, 391.
[5]Miers and Page, op cit, state at 187 that the preponderance of academic writers and some senior judges now argue that current judicial practice incorporates the literal and purposive interpretation and is better expressed as a series of questions: “What was the statute trying to do? Will the proposed interpretation give effect to that object? Is the interpretation ruled out by the language?”
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