Scope of Legislative History and Source

Scope of Legislative History and Source:International Practices

It should be noted, in this connection, that a House of Commons rule prohibits reference in debate to matters that are sub judice[1].

It is not necessary to examine in any detail the passage of the Bill through Parliament[2].

The Supreme Court of Canada had observed that no weight should be given to the commentaries of the Minister once the Act has been passed[3].

The Minster’s [legislature’s] Statement made after the passing of a statute cannot become the parliamentary history. The Supreme Court of Canada had taken this view as well “However, the commentaries are not an absolute authority. They are not binding on the courts, and their weight can vary, inter alia in light of other factors that may assist in interpreting the Civil Code’s provisions.[4]”

It has been laid down that, "The intention of Parliament is not to be judged by what is in its mind but by its expression of that mind in the statute itself, "-per LORD THANKERTON in Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions [7]. It is very rarely that the speech of a Minister introducing a Bill would be of assistance in the construction of the law that is ultimately enacted by Parliament. It is unnecessary to consider in what circumstances, if any, recourse to the speech of the Minister would be justified and whether such circumstances exist in this case. We have in fact perused the speech of the Minister and find nothing in it that will incline us to give a retrospective effect to the amendment.[8]

The scope of the history and allied documents and their relevance to ascertain that is to be ascertained has been stated lucidly in the following terms.

‘I would wish at this stage to consider the question whether it is necessary and appropriate to summon the aid of the background history of this disqualifying provision for the purpose of the interpretation of the section. In the interpretation of statutes there has been a considerable difference of opinion, firstly, on the correctness of having recourse to the history of a statute and, secondly, as to the occasion when as well as the extent to which such recourse, if any, should be had. It is a generally accepted principle that a court must in the first instance endeavour to gather the meaning of a statute by what it says and it is only if difficulties are encountered in reasonably interpreting it according to the ordinary rules of construction will it be permissible to refer to the state of the law at the time such statute was passed. Even so, the aid that should be obtained from such reference is very limited. Where the words of a statute are plain, however, it would not be permissible for a court to be guided by its history or by grounds of public policy and such other matters. Even where the meaning is obscure, it is very doubtful whether the parliamentary history of the statute can legitimately be used to assist its construction. I should wish to cite two passages here from Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edition, which, though not conclusive, throw some light on this matter. At page 127, on the subject of " History as an aid to interpretation ", he says :-" It was said by Alderson B. in Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter, that ' we do not construe Acts of Parliament by reference to history', and Farwell L.J. said in a later case, ' The mischief sought to be cured by an Act of Parliament must be sought in the Act itself. Although it may perhaps be legitimate to call history in aid to show what facts existed to bring about a statute, the inferences to be drawn therefrom are exceedingly slight'." Again at page 128, in regard to the use of Debates in Parliament, the following passage occurs :-'' It is not permissible in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment, to refer to ' the parliamentary history ' of a statute, in the sense of the debates which took place in Parliament when the statute was under consideration-As was said by Willes J. in Millar v. Taylor : ' The sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the House where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other House or to the Sovereign' ."

While it is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule in regard to this matter as conflicting opinions have been expressed by courts in different parts of the world, it seems to me that, if a reasonable construction "can be given, to the plain words of a statute, recourse to the previous history of the law would be unnecessary. It is on this basis that I have considered the question before us as it appears to me that a meaningful construction can be given to the relevant words without reference to the previous history of the law. Furthermore, the question that we are called upon to decide is, in my view, not one which can be resolved by a reference to the previous history of the legislature. [9]’

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[1] Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Another, Ex Parte Spath Holme Limited, R v. [2000] UKHL 61; [2001] 1 All ER 195; [2001] 2 WLR 15 (7th December, 2000)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/61.html
Cite as: [2000] EGCS 152, [2001] 2 WLR 15, (2001) 33 HLR 31, [2001] 1 EGLR 129, [2000] UKHL 61, [2000] EG 152, [2000] NPC 139, [2001] 2 AC 349, [2001] 1 All ER 195

[2] Jackson & Ors v. Her Majesty's Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 (13 October 2005)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/56.html
Cite as: [2005] 4 All ER 1253, [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 3 WLR 733

[3] Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862

[4] Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862

[7] Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1947 A.C. 367)

[8] Udalagama, .C V J v. Walpita, S.W., J. - NLR - 67 of 78 [1975] LKSC 8; (1975) 78 NLR 67 (19 August 1975)

[9] Ellawela v. Wijesundera - NLR - 265 of 74 [1971] LKSC 10; (1971) 74 NLR 265 (16 June 1971) G. P. A. SILVA, S.P.J

Authorities on Reference to Parliamentary debates

Leading Authorities on Reference to pariamentary debates

1. The Supreme Court has cautioned against construing a statute literally where the clause in question was added on the Senate floor and the legislative history gave no indication that Congress intended the broad reading the plain language would indicate.[1]

2. Reliance on congressional floor debate is unpersuasive. The perils of relying on that source for interpreting statutory language are well-known.[2]

3. A historical analysis normally provides less guidance to a statute's meaning than its final text. In the ordinary case, absent any "indication that doing so would frustrate Congress's clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.[3]"

4. "Te legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question.[4]"

5. The legislative history of the statute leaves little if any doubt that this understanding is correct[5].

6. Reliance on silence in the history is a new and even more dangerous phenomenon.[6]

7. The courts may, in some circumstances may not put reliance on the legislative history and in Sigmon Coal, [7]for example, the Court declined to rely on legislative history to displace the plain meaning of the statute, because the history consisted merely of a statement made by a single member of Congress. 226 F.3d at 306. Although such legislative history was "worthy of consideration, [it was] simply not the sort of conclusive legislative history that would trump contrary language in the statute."

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[1] See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 546-48, 60 S.Ct. 1059

[2] See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 n. 15, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002).

[3] BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 1778, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994) (SOUTER, J., dissenting).

[4] Cannon v. University of Chicago, [1979] USSC 85; 441 U.S. 677, 694[1979] USSC 85; , 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1956, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

[5] Griffin v Oceanic Contractors, Inc [1982] USSC 159; 458 U.S. 564; 102 S.Ct. 3245; 73 L.Ed.2d 973;No. 81-614 (30 June 1982)

[6] Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, [2004] USSC 5842; 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's novel "Canon of Canine Silence")

[7] Sigmon Coal[supra]

Next Scope of Legislative History

Chapter-4 American Citations: Parliamentary Debates onLegislative history Part-4-22

Chapter-4

American Citations: Parliamentary Debates onLegislative history

Part-4-22

‘In construing any statute the Court is entitled to have regard to the state of the law at the time the statute was passed’[1].

American Citations

American courts also place reliance on the history.’Decisions During the Past Decade in which Legislative History was Decisive of Construction of a particular Statutory Provision.’[2] The legislative history of the statute is also contrary to this interpretation. Although Congress located the phrase "competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory" within a savings clause, there is a fair amount of support for the argument that Congress intended this phrase to impose a negative restriction on local authorities' power to regulate.[3]. But there is no evidence to suggest that Congress intended the phrase to impose on local governments an affirmative obligation to enact regulations. If the phrase were meant to impose such an obligation, this point would surely have been mentioned prominently in the legislative history.[4] Questions have been raised about the appropriateness of use of legislative history at stage one of the Chevron analysis.[5]. In fact, the Supreme Court has often referred to legislative history at stage one, most recently in Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline [6] and in a series of earlier cases[7].

Our view is that where traditional doctrines of statutory interpretation have permitted use of legislative history, its use is permissible and even may be required at stage one of Chevron. This appears to be the functional approach of some other circuits as well.[8] The perceived dangers of the use of legislative history are particularly lessened where the legislative history is used as a check on an understanding obtained from text and structure. As we shall see, the legislative history, which is not disputed by the respondent, seems to pose none of the problems of potential manipulation of the system by members of Congress[9].

There are, of course, limitations on the extent to which courts appropriately may rely on the statements of individual legislators to color the meaning of statutory language[10]. Withal, contemporaneous statements by a sponsor, although far from conclusive, are generally entitled to respect.[11]. Moreover, in analyzing legislative history, specificity breeds credibility; thus, particularized explanations of how specific provisions of an act are meant to work have been deemed more instructive than generalized pronouncements anent statutory purpose. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 237, 104 S.Ct. 3026 (recognizing that statements made in floor debates may be persuasive as to Congress's intent when they are "very precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular words in a statute"). The statements we have quoted are of this genre. Perhaps most important, Senator Lautenberg's comments are perfectly consistent with the statutory language and the general purpose of the legislation, and promote a logically and linguistically coherent exegesis of the provision here at issue. They therefore reinforce the construction to which we are led by the plain meaning of the statutory text.[12]

‘In fact, the Supreme Court has used legislative history in different ways at stage one. It has used it merely to confirm plain text reading[13]’It has used legislative history to give content to specific statutory terms said to have different textual meanings.[14]. In addition to the requirement to read the text in context and in light of its place in the overall statutory scheme, the court also found permissible resort to "other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.[15]" The court then explored the legislative history of both the original and later statutes.[16]

We look to legislative history to check our understanding and determine whether there is a clearly expressed intention by the Congress which is contrary to the plain language of the statute[17].

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[1] Bell v. Bell [supra] per LORD KEITH

[2] United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, Inc., [1939] USSC 37; 306 U.S. 68, 59 S.Ct. 456, 83 L.Ed. 492; United States v. Towery, [1939] USSC 53; 306 U.S. 324, 59 S.Ct. 522, 83 L.Ed. 678; Kessler v. Strecher, [1939] USSC 79; 307 U.S. 22, 59 S.Ct. 694, 83 L.Ed. 1082; United States v. Maher, [1939] USSC 93; 307 U.S. 148, 59 S.Ct. 768, 83 L.Ed. 1162; United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219[1939] USSC 104; , 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249; Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, [1939] USSC 139; 308 U.S. 39, 60 S.Ct. 51, 84 L.Ed. 20; Palmer v. Massachusetts, [1939] USSC 124; 308 U.S. 79, [1939] USSC 124; 60 S.Ct. 34, 84 L.Ed. 93; Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, [1939] USSC 131; 308 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 160, 84 L.Ed. 151; Haggar Co. v. Helvering, [1940] USSC 67; 308 U.S. 389, 60 S.Ct. 337, 84 L.Ed. 340; American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, [1940] USSC 1; 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347; Kalb v. Feuerstein, [1940] USSC 81; 308 U.S. 433, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370; Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 626, 60 S.Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585, 1035; South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, [1940] USSC 43; 309 U.S. 251, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732; Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, [1940] USSC 42; 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 261, 84 L.Ed. 738; Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 60 S.Ct. 566, 84 L.Ed. 770; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., [1940] USSC 57; 309 U.S. 390, 60 S.Ct. 681, 84 L.Ed. 825; United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 60 S.Ct. 749, 84 L.Ed. 1050; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, [1940] USSC 91; 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263; United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345; United States v. Dickerson, [1940] USSC 101; 310 U.S. 554, 60 S.Ct. 1034, 84 L.Ed. 1356; Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., [1940] USSC 119; 311 U.S. 46, 61 S.Ct. 109, 85 L.Ed. 29; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 61 S.Ct. 97, 85 L.Ed. 58; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products[1940] USSC 121; , 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63; Helvering v. Janney, [1940] USSC 130; 311 U.S. 189, 61 S.Ct. 241, 85 L.Ed. 118, 131 A.L.R. 980; Taft v. Helvering, [1940] USSC 137; 311 U.S. 195, 61 S.Ct. 244, 85 L.Ed. 122; Hines v. Davidowitz, [1941] USSC 22; 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581; United States v. Gilliland, [1941] USSC 36; 312 U.S. 86, 61 S.Ct. 518, 85 L.Ed. 598; Palmer v. Webster & Atlas National Bank of Boston, [1941] USSC 65; 312 U.S. 156, 61 S.Ct. 542, 85 L.Ed. 642; United States v. Cooper Corp., [1941] USSC 88; 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071; Helvering v. Enright's Estate, [1941] USSC 82; 312 U.S. 636, 61 S.Ct. 777, 85 L.Ed. 1093; Maguire v. Commissioner, [1941] USSC 104; 313 U.S. 1, 61 S.C . 789[1941] USSC 104; , 85 L.Ed. 1149; Helvering v. Campbell, [1941] USSC 100; 313 U.S. 15, 61 S.Ct. 798, 85 L.Ed. 1159; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, [1941] USSC 117; 313 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, [1941] USSC 115; 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217; Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 61 S.Ct. 878, 85 L.Ed. 1310; Benitez Sampayo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, [1941] USSC 132; 313 U.S. 270, 61 S.Ct. 953, 85 L.Ed. 1324; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, [1941] USSC 138; 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, [1941] USSC 138; 86 L.Ed. 28, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales Inc., [1942] USSC 10; 314 U.S. 244, 62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184; Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249; Gray v. Powell, [1941] USSC 167; 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301; District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329; Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service, [1942] USSC 6; 314 U.S. 498, 510[1942] USSC 6; , 62 S.Ct. 384, 389[1942] USSC 6; , 86 L.Ed. 371; Duncan v. Thompson, [1942] USSC 14; 315 U.S. 1, 62 S.Ct. 422, 86 L.Ed. 575; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, [1942] USSC 64; 315 U.S. 357, 788[1942] USSC 64; , 62 S.Ct. 651, 86 L.Ed. 895; United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters[1942] USSC 50; , 315 U.S. 521, 62 S.Ct. 642, 86 L.Ed. 1004; Stonite Product Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., [1942] USSC 55; 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct. 780, 86 L.Ed. 1026; National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co.[1942] USSC 91; , 315 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 846, 86 L.Ed. 1120; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., [1942] USSC 89; 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104; United States, to Use of Noland Co. v. Irwin, [1942] USSC 100; 316 U.S. 23, 62 S.Ct. 899, 86 L.Ed. 1241; Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., [1942] USSC 98; 316 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 1022, 86 L.Ed. 1381; Kirschbaum v. Walling, [1942] USSC 118; 316 U.S. 517, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638; Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., [1942] USSC 125; 316 U.S. 527, 62 S.Ct. 1125, 86 L.Ed. 1649; Marine Harbor Properties, Inc., v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., [1942] USSC 150; 17 U.S. 78, 63 S.Ct. 93, 87 L.Ed. 64; Braverman v. United States, [1942] USSC 136; 317 U.S. 49, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23; Riggs v. Del Drago, [1942] USSC 139; 317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109, 87 L.Ed. 106, 142 A.L.R. 1131; Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, [1942] USSC 137; 317 U.S. 69, 63 S.Ct. 115, 87 L.Ed. 58; State Bank of Hardinsburg v. Brown, 317 U.S. 135, 63 S.Ct. 128, 87 L.Ed. 140; Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp., [1943] USSC 22; 317 U.S. 144, 63 S.Ct. 133, 87 L.Ed. 146; United States v. Wayne Pump Co., [1942] USSC 155; 317 U.S. 200, 63 S.Ct. 191, 87 L.Ed. 184; Parker v. Brown, [1943] USSC 8; 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., [1943] USSC 25; 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460; Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., [1943] USSC 13; 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, [1943] USSC 54; 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443; United States v. Monia, [1943] USSC 19; 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376; Ziffrin, Inc., v. United States, [1943] USSC 57; 318 U.S. 73, 63 S.Ct. 465, 87 L.Ed. 621; Palmer v. Hoffman, [1943] USSC 52; 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719; Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., [1943] USSC 31; 318 U.S. 125, 63 S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656; Robinette v. Helvering[1943] USSC 41; , 318 U.S. 184, 63 S.Ct. 540, 87 L.Ed. 700; Smith v. Shaughnessy, [1943] USSC 42; 318 U.S. 176, 63 S.Ct. 545, 87 L.Ed. 690; Helvering v. Sabine Transp. Co., [1943] USSC 48; 318 U.S. 306, 63 S.Ct. 569, 87 L.Ed. 773; Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., [1943] USSC 45; 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 589, 87 L.Ed. 724, 158 A.L.R. 832; United States v. Swift & Co., [1943] USSC 66; 318 U.S. 442, 63 S.Ct. 684, 87 L.Ed. 889; Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R. Corp., [1943] USSC 82; 318 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 692, 87 L.Ed. 892; Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, [1943] USSC 71; 318 U.S. 643, 63 S.Ct. 773, 87 L.Ed. 1055; Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U.S. 61, 63 S.Ct. 953, 87 L.Ed. 1258; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344; Boone v. Lightner, [1943] USSC 137; 319 U.S. 561, 63 S.Ct. 1223, 87 L.Ed. 1587; Schneiderman v. United States[1943] USSC 144; , 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796; Hirabayashi v. United States, [1943] USSC 134; 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774; Roberts v. United States, [1943] USSC 159; 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41; United States v. Dotterweich, [1943] USSC 168; 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48; Crescent Express Lines v. U ited States[1943] USSC 164; , 320 U.S. 401, 64 S.Ct. 167, 88 L.Ed. 127; Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, [1944] USSC 9; 320 U.S. 422, 64 S.Ct. 227, 88 L.Ed. 143; United States v. Laudani, [1944] USSC 5; 320 U.S. 543, 64 S.Ct. 315, 88 L.Ed. 300, 149 A.L.R. 492; United States v. Myers, [1944] USSC 6; 320 U.S. 561, 64 S.Ct. 337, 88 L.Ed. 312; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, [1944] USSC 13; 321 U.S. 67, 64 S.Ct. 370, 88 L.Ed. 544; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R.[1944] USSC 14; , 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534, 150 A.L.R. 810; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 126, 64 S.Ct. 471, 88 L.Ed. 602; Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, [1944] USSC 19; 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, [1944] USSC 38; 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754; Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, [1944] USSC 59; 321 U.S. 634, 64 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed. 978; National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publication, [1944] USSC 91; 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170; Carolene Product Co. v. United States, [1944] USSC 118; 323 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 1, 89 L.Ed. 15, 155 A.L.R. 1371; Smith v. Davis, [1944] USSC 130; 323 U.S. 111, 65 S.Ct. 157, 89 L.Ed. 107; United States v. Rosenwasser, [1945] USSC 9; 323 U.S. 360, 65 S.Ct. 295, 89 L.Ed. 301; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, [1945] USSC 17; 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335, 89 L.Ed. 414; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, [1945] USSC 73; 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322; Central States Electric Co. v. City of Muscatine[1945] USSC 91; , 324 U.S. 138, 65 S.Ct. 565, 89 L.Ed. 801; Gemsco, Inc., v. Walling, [1945] USSC 48; 324 U.S. 244, 65 S.Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921; Canadian Aviator v. United States, [1945] USSC 45; 324 U.S. 215, 65 S.Ct. 639, 89 L.Ed. 901; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, [1945] USSC 60; 324 U.S. 515, 65 S.Ct. 749, 89 L.Ed. 1150; A. H. Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095, 157 A.L.R. 876; Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, [1945] USSC 90; 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296; Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., [1945] USSC 79; 324 U.S. 746, 65 S.Ct. 971, 89 L.Ed. 1338; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America[1945] USSC 88; , 325 U.S. 161, 65 S.Ct. 1063, 89 L.Ed. 1534; Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, [1945] USSC 144; 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, [1945] USSC 137; 326 U.S. 60, 6[1945] USSC 137; 5 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed. 2051; Markham v. Cabell, [1945] USSC 159; 326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165; John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, [1946] USSC 19; 326 U.S. 521, 66 S.Ct. 299, 90 L.Ed. 278; Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling [1946] USSC 20; 326 U.S. 657, 66 S.Ct. 413, 90 L.Ed. 383; Mabee v White Plains Pub Co., [1946] USSC 32; 327 U.S. 178, 66 S.Ct. 511, 90 L.Ed. 607; Duggan v. Sansberry, [1946] USSC 49; 327 U.S. 499, 66 S.Ct. 657, 90 L.Ed. 809; United States v. Carbone, [1946] USSC 67; 327 U.S. 633, 66 S.Ct. 734, 90 L.Ed. 904; Williams v. United States, [1946] USSC 72 ; 327 US 711, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 962; Federal Trade Commission v. A. P. W. Paper Co., [1946] USSC 88; 328 U.S. 193, 66 S.Ct. 932, 90 L.Ed. 1165; Hust v. Moore-McCormack, [1946] USSC 107; 328 U.S. 707, 66 S.Ct. 1218, 90 L.Ed 1534; United States v. Sheridan, [1947] USSC 20; 329 U.S. 379, 67 S.Ct. 332, 91 L.Ed. 359; Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, [1947] USSC 22; 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544[1947] USSC 22; , 91 L.Ed. 794; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, [1947] USSC 40; 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed 973; American Stevedores Inc. v. Porello, [1947] USSC 108; 330 U.S. 446, 67 S.Ct. 847, 91 L.Ed. 1011; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, [1947] USSC 52; 330 U.S. 567, 67 S.Ct. 894, 91 L.Ed. 1102; United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Co., [1947] USSC 62; 330 U.S. 709, 67 S.Ct. 997, 91 L.Ed. 1192; McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 331 U.S. 96, 67 S.Ct. 1165, 91 L.Ed. 1365; Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, [1947] USSC 67; 331 U.S. 132, 67 S.Ct. 1168, 91 L.Ed. 1391; Williams v. Austrian, [1947] USSC 105; 331 U.S. 642, 67 S.Ct. 1443, 91 L.Ed. 1718; Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., [1948] USSC 29; 332 U.S. 524, 68 S.Ct. 229; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, [1948] USSC 14; 333 U.S. 6, 68 S.Ct. 374; Hilton v. Sullivan[1948] USSC 73; , 334 U.S. 323, 68 S.Ct. 1020; United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 68 S.Ct. 1169; United States v. Zazove, [1948] USSC 105; 334 U.S. 602, 68 S.Ct. 1284; United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, [1948] USSC 95; 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 375; Ahrens v. Clark, [1948] USSC 91; 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443.

[3] See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H8460, H8461 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (discussing the need to ensure that cities' franchise fee schemes treat competitors equally)

[4] Cablevision of Boston, Inc , Plaintiff, Appellant, v Public Improvement Commission of the City of Boston; Joseph f Casazza, Michael Galvin, Gary Mocia, Para M Jayasinghe, and Stephen Shea, as Commissioners of the Public Improvement Commission of the City of Boston; City of Boston; Boston Edison Co; Becocom, Inc ; RCN-Becocom, LLC; RCN Telecom Services of Massachusetts, Inc ; and RCN Corporation, Defendants, Appellees [1999] USCA1 210; 184 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (25 August 1999)

[5] See, e.g., Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.[2004] USCA2 261; , 376 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir.2004)

[6] Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, [2004] USSC 13; 540 U.S. 581, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 1243[2004] USSC 13; , 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004)

[7] See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., [2000] USSC 24; 529 U.S. 120, 133[2000] USSC 24; , 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (using "later [congressional] Acts" which spoke "more specifically to the topic at hand" to determine whether the statute evidenced a clear congressional intent in Chevron step one); MCI Telecomms. v. AT & T, [1994] USSC 24; 512 U.S. 218, 232-33[1994] USSC 24; , 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994) (examining legislative histories of later enactments and finding them inconclusive); Pauley, 501 U.S. at 697-99[1991] USSC 116; , 111 S.Ct. 2524 (examining the text of statute and legislative history to determine that Congress intended to delegate to the agency broad policymaking discretion); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., [1990] USSC 108; 496 U.S. 633, 648-50[1990] USSC 108; , 110 S.Ct. 2668, 110 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990) (using legislative history in Chevron step one as another "traditional tool[ ] of statutory construction" to conclude that the statute did not "evince a clear congressional intent"); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., [1988] USSC 187; 488 U.S. 204, 214[1988] USSC 187; , 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (using legislative history as a check where statutory text is clear that the Secretary had no authority); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, [1986] USSC 161; 478 U.S. 221, 233-41, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (examining legislative history and determining that Congress has not directly spoken to the issue).30

[8] See Coke, 376 F.3d at 127 (using legislative history at step one "without attaching primacy" to it); Am. Rivers v. F.E.R.C., 201 F.3d 1186, 1196 & n. 16 (9th Cir.2000) (adhering to the practice of considering legislative history in Chevron step one).

[9] See Strickland, 48 F.3d at 17 n. 3 (reciting the arguments of critics that "legislative history is written by staffers rather than by Congress itself; that it is easily manipulated; that it complicates the tasks of execution and obedience; and that it often is shaped by members of Congress who cannot achieve passage of a desired interpretation in the actual text of an enacted statute").

[10]See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984)

[11] See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, [1982] USSC 95; 456 U.S. 512, 526-27[1982] USSC 95; , 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982); FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., [1976] USSC 122; 426 U.S. 548, 564[1976] USSC 122; , 96 S.Ct. 2295, 49 L.Ed.2d 49 (1976)

[12]See Brock v. Pierce County, [1986] USSC 96; 476 U.S. 253, 263[1986] USSC 96; , 106 S.Ct. 1834, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986) (noting that statements in floor debates evidence legislative intent when they are consistent with statutory language and other legislative history)

[13] .Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 649[1990] USSC 108; , 110 S.Ct. 2668; Bowen, 488 U.S. at 214[1988] USSC 187; , 109 S.Ct. 468; Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 233-41, 106 S.Ct. 2860.

[14] Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 124 S.Ct. at 1244 (statutory term "age" in ADEA refers to use of ADEA as a remedy for "unfair preference based on relative youth")

[15] Id. at 133[2000] USSC 24; , 120 S.Ct. 1291.

[16] Id. at 144-55[2000] USSC 24; , 120 S.Ct. 1291.

[17] See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 & n. 12[1987] USSC 32; , 107 S.Ct. 1207.