Statute-Provisions not to be interpreted in Isolation

It is basic rule of construction that the provision, clause, sentence, phrase and the words of statute should be read as a whole and reading of any provision in isolation is against all cannon of construction.
First, as the Supreme Court has observed, statutory terms must not be interpreted in isolation but, rather, must be interpreted in the context of the whole statute in the manner "most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested." Commissioner v. Engle, [1984] USSC 4; 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984); see also Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., [1998] USSC 50;523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998); Crandon v. United States[1990] USSC 25; , 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); United States v. Morton,[1984] USSC 140; 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).[2001] USCA9 284 Note This ruling contains many principles of interpretation and can be referred to.

"..., even if our duty were to determine the meaning of "title" in isolation, we interpret such undefined terms not as technical terms of art but rather in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning in the context in which they arise. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, [1995] USSC 5; 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural, ordinary meaning); United States v. Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1994) (same); FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (same); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., [2000] USSC 24; 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) ("The meaning--or ambiguity--of certain words may only become evident when placed in context."); Deal v. United States , [1993] USSC 56;508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) ("[T]he meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.") observing further in this case that; 'The most natural meaning of "title " in this context is "exclusive possession and control." See Black's Law Dictionary 1493 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "title"); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1881 (3d ed. 1992) (same). The United States has exclusive possession and control of two interests in navigable waters in Alaska, its navigational servitude and its reserved water rights. All navigable waters are therefore "public lands" upon which the rural subsistence priority applies.

Fourth, we must interpret congressional enactments "to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, [1982] USSC 70; 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982).[2001] USCA9 284 Observing further that:"The Supreme Court has cautioned repeatedly against interpreting undefined statutory terms in isolation for a reason-- doing so may lead to absurd results. Such is the case with the dissent's interpretation. The dissent insists upon a strict, technical interpretation of the term "title," ignoring the context in which it is used. It then notes, citing Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, 347 U.S. 239, 247 n.10 (1954), that the reserved rights doctrine vests in the United States only a usufructuary interest in water, not an ownership interest. But that is not all Niagara Mohawk says. It also says that the United States cannot hold title to a body of water: "Neither sovereign nor subject can acquire anything more than a mere usufructuary right" in a body of water; a sovereign can "never" acquire "the ownership" of a body of water. Id.

Deference: Court the Final Authority to Interpret

Interpreting ANILCA is our responsibility. As Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) . We should not abdicate this responsibility by deferring to the agency's interpretation of ANILCA. Even if deference to the agency's interpretation of ANILCA were appropriate, we could not endorse as reasonable an interpretation that ignores congressional purpose and focuses myopically on the term "title." The agency's interpretation, which the Court today adopts as its own, forsakes a clear congressional purpose that runs consistently throughout the statute in favor of a single, undefined word. Fixation on this single word in the several-hundred-page statute is inappropriate for several reasons.[2001] USCA9 284

Deference :When Reduced and Not available

The agency offered no explanation for this sudden interpretive change of heart. "An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is `entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30 (quoting Watts v. Alaska, [1981] USSC 78; 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)); see also Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. Lujan, [1990] USCA9 461; 904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that when an agency changes its interpretation of a statute without explanation it should be accorded less deference).[2001] USCA9 284

Basic Principles in Taxing Statute

Definition Terms to prevail

"* * * In construing this statute, we are bound by the definition of terms made use of by the Legislature. As stated by this court in the case State v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 642, 266 N.W. 41, 42, `the Legislature is its own lexicographer.' The guiding and controlling consideration is `the disposition of the goods made by the buyer, not the character of the business of the seller or the buyer.' * * *"

Applying the rules of interpretation heretofore set out to the facts of this case we conclude: (1) the meaning of the words "sale at retail" adopted by the trial court is not a common, ordinary, usual, or accepted meaning of such words; 
Satatute to be read as awhole
(2) the statute read as a whole does not indicate an intention upon the part of Congress to so define the words; (3) there is nothing in the legislative history which demands such a construction; and 
In case of ambiguity: Interpretation favoring Tax-payer
(4) taxes should be imposed by Congress, not by the courts, and when serious doubt arises as to taxability, as it does in this case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The law should be applied as written, and strained and artificial constructions should be avoided.[Gellman v United States [1956] USCA8 105; 235 F.2d 87 (25 June 1956)]

as a whole

In determining legislative intent, we must consider the statute read as a whole. United States v. Morton, [1984] USSC 140; 467 U.S. 822, 828[1984] USSC 140; , 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773[1984] USSC 140; , 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984); Sierra Club v. Clark, [1985] USCA8 115; 755 F.2d 608, 613 (8th Cir.1985). United States v Jones [1987] USCA8 142; 811 F.2d 444 (10 February 1987) Infact it may be noted that:" interpretation, begins with and is circumscribed by the statute's text. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818 (1999); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., [1980] USSC 104; 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). If "the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention," our role is to effectuate that intention. Dunn v. CFTC, [1997] USSC 18; 519 U.S. 465, 479 (1997) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., [1960] USSC 99; 363 U.S. 536, 553 (1960).

“…..read as a whole, clearly expresses Congress's intent to create a federal regulatory scheme "to protect the resources related to subsistence needs" and "to provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to continue to do so." 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101(b)-(c); see also id. §§§§ 3111-3114. To that end, Congress mandated that "the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes. " Id. §§ 3114. Congress expressly protected as subsistence uses "the customary and traditional uses by Alaska residents . . . for direct personal or family consumption as food" and for barter in exchange for other subsistence commodities. Id. §§ 3113 (emphasis added)."2001] USCA9 284

Deference to Agency Interpretation

1.There is sufficient ambiguity in the statute and the regulations that we might defer to the Service's interpretation anyway. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, [1992] USCA7 129; 956 F.2d 1360, 1365 (7th Cir.1992). 

2.But such deference applies only to "reasoned and consistent" agency positions; it does not apply to "agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice." Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, [1988] USSC 187; 488 U.S. 204, 212[1988] USSC 187; , 109 S.Ct. 468, 473[1988] USSC 187; , 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988).

Harco Holdings Incorporated v United States [1992] USCA7 1187; 977 F.2d 1027 (9 November 1992)

And, as the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, "In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent with the congressional purpose. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., [1973] USSC 232; 414 U.S. 86 (94 S.Ct. 334[1973] USSC 232; , 38 L.Ed.2d 287) (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381, (89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371) (1969)." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1075[1974] USSC 29; , 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)Citizens for Better Environment v Environmental Protection Agency [1979] USCA7 308; 596 F.2d 720; 12 ERC 1657, 13 ERC 1094, 9 Envtl. L.; Rep. 20,092 (16 May 1979)
Further Judicial deference to agency interpretations is normally justified by the agency's expertise in the regulated subject matter. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., [1990] USSC 108; 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("[A]gency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference."). The agency possesses no expertise, however, that qualifies it to determine whether the rural subsistence priority applies to navigable waters. The issue "is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, [1987] USSC 32; 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction.".and that  the issue presented is a question of pure law and does not implicate agency expertise in any meaningful way, we need  not defer under Chevron . . . ." Magana-Pizano v. INS, [1999] USCA9 704; 200 F.3d 603, 611 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999)