Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation of statute
Section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act ,1901 deals with the circumstances in which extrinsic materials may be used in the interpretation of statutes. They may be used where they are capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of a provision of an Act:
to confirm the ordinary meaning taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act; or
to determine meaning when the provision is ambiguous or obscure or where the ordinary meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable[1].
In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of P.T. Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir & Ors. [2] Their Lordships observed that context, purport and object of the statute is to be ascertained that whether "shall" to be construed as a mandatory or directory and further "where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty between time prescribed same would be directory and not mandatory. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature although employs the word "shall" may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. The Court cannot supply casus omissus."
The Court while interpreting the provision of a statute, although, is not entitled to re-write the statute itself, is not debarred from "ironing out the creases". The court should always make an attempt to uphold the rules and interpret the same in such a manner which would make it workable. It is also a well settled principles of law that an attempt should be made to give effect to each and every word employed in a statute and such interpretation which would render a particular provision redundant or otiose should be avoided.
It has also been observed in connection of the contextual approach that:
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to any as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation, Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in itsplace.[3]."
Ex praece dentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio.' The best interpretation is made from the context.[4] Even where the definition is exhaustive in as much as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context[5]. Court should try to understand the spirit of the text and not be bound by letter[6]. The literal interpretation would feed injustice in perpetuity denying to the employees of sickness benefit etc. under the Act, which would be avoided, lest the purpose of the Act would be frustrated[7].
The Act must always be kept in view in construing the context in which a particular word is used[8]. The concept which prompted the legislature to enact this welfare law should also be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions' Due weight ought to be given to the words "unlessthe context otherwise requires"[9] The word "practise" when used with reference ,to an Advocate is an elastic expression, having no rigid or fixed connotation and the precise ambit of its contents can be ascertained only by reference to the rules of the particular forum in which the profession is exercised[10].The context is of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the words used in a statute[11].
[2] P.T. Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 498.
[3] Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless Co. reported in 1987(1) SCC 424
[4] PROVASH CHANDRA DALUIVs.BISWANATH BANERJEE;1989 AIR 1834; 1989 SCR (2) 401
[5] Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co.Ltd.v.M/sFraser and Ross[1960] 3 SCR 857
[6]Mangat Rai v. Kidarnath, [1981] 1 SCR 476,HudsonCounty Water Co. v. Me Carter,209US 349,refd.to.
[7]C.E.S.C. LTD. .Vs.SUBHASH CHANDRA BOSE., . 1992 AIR 573, 1991 SCR Supl. (2) 267
[8] Commissioner of Expenditure-Tax, Gujarat, v.Darshan Surendra Parekh, [1968] 2 SCR 589
[9] N.K. JAIN AND OTHERSVs.C.K.SHAH AND OTHERS, 1991 AIR 1289; 1991 SCR (1) 938, Commissioner of Expenditure-Tax, Gujarat, Ahmedabad v. Darshan Surendra Parekh, [1968] 2 SCR 589; Bennet Coleman & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta, [1970] 1 SCR181; Organo Chemical Industries and Another v. Union of India and Others, [1979] 4 SCC 573; Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, [1965] 1 SCR 7; State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhuj Maganlal and Another, [1976] 3 SCR 1076 and Vanguard Fire & Gen. Ins Co. v. Fraser & Ross, AIR 1960 SC971, Parekh cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1957]2 LLJ 490.
[10] SUPREME COURT REPORTSASWINI Kumarvs.ARABINDA BOSE ,1952 AIR 369,1953 SCR1
[11] Town V. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, Helvering V. Gregory 69 F.(2)D809; Heydon's Case (1584) 3 W. Rep. 16; 76 ER 637; Riverwear Commissioners V. Adamson (1876-77) App. Cs 743 At 764Referred To.[Re UNION OF Indiavs.:SANKAL CHAND HIMATLAL SHETH;1977 AIR 2328; 1978 SCR (1) 423]
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