Modern Approach/Interpretation method
The "modern" interpretation method was recognized by Côté, supra, at p. 234:
In trying to ascertain legislative intent, the reader must begin with the text chosen by the author as a vehicle for his thoughts. According to Lord Denning,
Beyond doubt the task of the lawyer and of the judge is to find out the intention of Parliament. In doing this, you must, of course, start with the words used in the statute: but not end with them as some people seem to think.
‘Two reasons in particular militate in favour of going beyond the enactment. First, as we have seen, the goal of interpretation is more than simply discovering the historic thought of the author of the enactment: it has other goals, and consequently requires a number of factors to be taken into account, such as the consequences of interpretation, which have nothing to do with the text itself. Second, even if we consider that interpretation's sole purpose is to reveal the thought of the legislator, two principal reasons dictate going beyond the literal method in order to reveal such thought. Firstly, because of what has often been called the "open texture" of language, the literal approach is often not sufficient to dispel all doubts about an enactment's application. Secondly, the literal approach confines the courts to the explicit component of Parliament's message: the implicit component, which is derived from the text of the statute, must also be considered in the quest for legislative intent.’
The "modern" interpretation method has also been recognized in other common law countries.[1]
‘However, all these [various successive stages of interpretation] together with the rules and presumptions applicable to them are always at least implicitly relevant in the sense that they must be borne in mind even if their applicability to the interpretation of a specific provision of an enactment is quite self-evident, and even if the "correct" answers to the questions of understanding they raise, can be arrived at intuitively’.
The presumptions are to serve as basic guidelines throughout the process of interpretation. Because due cognisance of the operation of the presumptions is not necessarily a clearly discernible first stage in the process of interpretation, since the presumptions obtain throughout all the stages of interpretation, the interpreter should be conscious of their existence, contents and operation right from the outset. This awareness of the presumptions should underlie his step by step interpretation of the enactment, carrying him through the various stages involved, and guiding him in the "right direction".
During this first stage of interpretation recourse may as a rule be had to dictionaries to ascertain the "ordinary meaning" of words or expressions. . . . An interpreter may, as a matter of fact, by no means remain with the result obtained by applying this rule even though "the language of the enactment is (ostensibly) clear". . . . The real meaning of an enactment may in fact remain hidden to an interpreter who adheres merely to "clear language" or who qualifies this language -- if it happens not to be so clear -- without due cognisance of all the other co-equal structural elements which constitute the overall context of meaning within which the enactment prevails.
Finally, the "modern" interpretation method was reformulated in Canada by Professor R. Sullivan: Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 131:
There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just. [Emphasis added.]
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