The exercise of interpretation begins with the plain reading of the text of the statute without reading in/reading down, adding or subtracting a word. If the intent is clear that is the end of the exercise. There are situations where any alteration or any alternative is required. Courts are reluctant to add or subtract a word as it may tantamount to judicial law making..[blogger].
In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.
[Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. ----, ----[1991] USSC 3; , 111 S.Ct. 599, 603[1991] USSC 3; , 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991)]
First, though courts must attempt to discern legislative intent based on the statute as a whole
[ see Thinking Machs. Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp., [1995] USCA1 514; 67 F.3d 1021, 1024 (1st Cir.1995)]
The best hope for capturing congressional intent is by focusing on the language purposefully deployed by the legislature. Thus, a statute ordinarily will be construed according to its plain meaning.
[See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,[1992] USSC 98; 505 U.S. 469, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594[1992] USSC 98; , 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992); In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d at 419; Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 67-68 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1959, 131 L.Ed.2d 851 (1995). But, when Congress' words admit of more than one reasonable interpretation, "plain meaning" becomes an impossible dream, and an inquiring court must look to the policies, principles and purposes underlying the statute in order to construe it. See Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 67; see also Sullivan v. CIA, [1993] USCA1 270; 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir.1993) (explaining that courts may "look behind statutory language" when the legislature "blows an uncertain trumpet"). Congress, after all, does not legislate in a vacuum.]
’Rather, we must follow the canons of statutory interpretation which demand that a court give meaning to each word and phrase when explicating a statute, and read the component parts of a legislative enactment as a unified whole.
[ See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., [1994] USCA1 432; 33 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1176, 130 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1995); United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., [1985] USCA11 14; 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st Cir.1985); see also Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, [1992] USCA1 399; 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir.1992)] t is apodictic that our first recourse must be to the statute's text and structure.
[See United States v. O'Neil, [1993] USCA1 617; 11 F.3d 292, 295 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., [1987] USCA1 276; 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir.1987). Following this path, it is evident that CERCLA differentiates between "action[s] for recovery of ... costs" and "action[s] for contribution." Compare 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(g)(2) with id. Sec. 9613(g)(3). Although Congress did not explicitly plot the boundary that divides these two types of actions, we are not wholly without guidance. Under accepted canons of construction, legal terms used in framing a statute are ordinarily presumed to have been intended to convey their customary legal meaning. See Bradley v. United States, [1973] USSC 49; 410 U.S. 605, 609[1973] USSC 49; , 93 S.Ct. 1151, 1154-55[1973] USSC 49; , 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973) (holding that "the law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense") (citation omitted); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir.1981) (similar); see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. Sec. 47.30, at 262 (5th ed. 1992). This precept has special force when, as now, there is no persuasive evidence that Congress aspired to use a particular legal term in some unusual or unorthodox sense.]
Plain words and Structure of statute
In approaching statutory interpretation, "it is axiomatic that the plain words and structure of the statute must be paramount." United States v. Aversa, [1993] USCA1 15; 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir.1993) (en banc).
Avoiding Illogical Results.
It is also an established canon of statutory construction that a legislature's words should never be given a meaning that produces a stunningly counterintuitive result--at least if those words, read without undue straining, will bear another, less jarring meaning.
[See Kelly v. United States, [1991] USCA1 32; 924 F.2d 355, 361 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Meyer, [1987] USCA1 20; 808 F.2d 912, 919 (1st Cir.1987); Sutherland Stat. Const. Sec. 45.12 (5th ed.). This principle goes back to the early days of the Republic. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 355, 4 L.Ed. 579(1819)]
Intent to be derived from the wording of Statute
As a rule, courts should resort to legislative history and other guides to congressional intent when the words of a statute give rise to ambiguity or when they lead to an unreasonable interpretation.
[See, e.g., United States v. Charles George Trucking Co.,[1987] USCA1 276; 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir.1987); Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., [1977] USCA1 136; 555 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir.1977), aff'd[1978] USSC 149; , 438 U.S. 531, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 57 L.Ed.2d 932 (1978). Though we believe that a generous reading of section 3583(e)(3) best comports with plain language, statutory structure, logic, and sound policy, we are aware that ambiguity is commonly thought to exist when statutory language is susceptible to differing, but nonetheless plausible, constructions. See United States v. R.L.C., --- U.S. ----, ----[1992] USSC 34; , 112 S.Ct. 1329, 1334[1992] USSC 34; , 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992); cf. Allen v. Adage, Inc., [1992] USCA1 311; 967 F.2d 695, 700 (1st Cir.1992) (explaining when ambiguity exists in the text of a contract). Here, as the weight of authority unquestionably attests, there is room for disagreement over the meaning of the SRR provision. Therefore, we continue our inquiry.]
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