The legislature did not define the term used "tagging" in the case of Quebec (Attorney General) v. Robitaille and the Court referred to Professor Pierre-André Côté[Interpretation of statutes, Centre for Research in Public Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal, 2nd ed., Cowansville, Editions Yvon Blais, 1990, p. 243.] stating that “ Pierre Andre- Cote teaches that in these cases, methods of interpretation are helping those who need to define:

 "Sub-Section 2

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD GRAMMAR

For the implementation of the grammatical method, we can make use of directives which specify the mode of application: it must give words their meaning in everyday language, 2) must give the words the meaning they had the date of adoption of the law 3) it must avoid adding under the law, or deprive them of effect.

Paragraph 1: The common meaning

As it is assumed that the author of the law will be understood by litigants is to say the entire population governed by the law, the law is deemed to be drafted in accordance with rules of language use in the population.

In particular, it must be presumed that the legislature intends the words in the same sense that the justiciable, that "Mr. All-the-world". "

[28]            Further, at page 269:

"Sub-Section 2

SECOND STATEMENT: "IF THE TEXT IS LIGHT IN SELF, DO NOT SEEK FURTHER"

Under this formulation, the interpreter should first read the provision under consideration. If, on reading, the formula seems to give a clear answer to questions raised by the application of the law, then the interpreter should stop his investigations and simply apply the provision.

We are indebted to J. Tindal, in the case Susser Peerage, this formulation of the Literal Rule, which would be classic:

If the terms of the law are themselves clear and unambiguous, it is sufficient to take them in their natural and ordinary meaning. In this case, these terms are by themselves, the best expression of the intention of legislature. ""

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Robitaille, 2005 CanLII 23425 (QC CQ)

Departure from Literal Rule..

 The following was observed in the case Vincent c. Forget, 2008 QCCS 2466 (CanLII) and it is being stated as it is to  illustrate that Literal approach has not found acceptance and there is tendency to shift from this approach to purposive approach/ Modern approach.[Blogger]

" In a recent unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal[7], in the writings of Madam Justice France Thibault, the latter wrote:

[30]            It is not necessary to talk long to say that the "modern principle" of interpretation set out by Elmer A. Driege authority is now in the Canadian jurisprudence. As written by Professor Pierre-André Côté in his book The Interpretation of Legislation:

Elmer A. Driege, in particular, has rejected the rule of plain meaning of texts advocating, in all cases, an interpretative approach that goes beyond the text. He contrasted the three "rules" classics (Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule) what he called the "modern principle" of interpretation:

"Today there is only one principle or approach, we must read the terms of a law in their entire context, the grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the spirit of the law, The purpose of the Act and legislative intent. "

This passage, frequently quoted and approved by members of the country's highest court, rejected the idea that the clear interpretation can only consider the terms of the law.

[31]            Article 12 of the Interpretation Act strengthens the application of this method:

All text is supposed to be remedial and is interpreted as the fairest and broadest consistent with achieving its purpose.

[32]            In that same book, the author criticizes the theory side, which limits the interpreter to the text of the law:

Today, the argument that the interpreter can be restricted to the exegesis of one form of the law and disregard the context is clearly repudiated by both in doctrine and jurisprudence.

[...]

In conclusion, we can say that currently there is still an emerging consensus on the Supreme Court of Canada around the idea that interpretation can never be confined to the text of the law, whether establish the meaning of the legal rule or to explain the meaning given the term of the interpretation process.

[36]            In my view, the appellant and respondent have both right and wrong. In the case of the appellant, it is right to refer to the modern interpretation, but it is wrong to refuse to consider exception to a provision in case of doubt, order a restrictive interpretation.Conversely, the respondent erred in denying the application of modern principles of interpretation, but he has reason to remember that a provision of emergency may be interpreted narrowly. As the Supreme Court has stated, the use of other principles of interpretation will be possible if the teleological approach does not reveal the meaning of a provision..

[v. Attorney General of Quebec Robert Paulin and Samson Bélair / Deloitte & Touche Inc.., 2007 QCCA 1716 (CanLII), 2007 QCCA 1716, decision of December 12, 2007, CAQ 200-09-005590-069, dd. Thibault, Morin, Vezina.] original French citation as [Robert Paulin et Samson Bélair/Deloitte & Touche Inc., 2007 QCCA 1716 (CanLII) , 2007 QCCA 1716, décision du 12 décembre 2007, CAQ 200-09-005590-069, jj.]


Vincent c. Forget, 2008 QCCS 2466 (CanLII) [The judgement deals with Internet and can be referred to in case of need. It is a decision of year 2008.]

One of the important derivations of the rulings of the court will help us in stating the use of literal rule. One may deviate from the normal rule of interpretation if the meaning is clear and is not subject of discussion or any form of confusion. The literal rule for statutory interpretation is not applicable and the terms must be given the ordinary meanings ascribed thereto in dictionaries, including medical and legal dictionaries, where applicable.The following was observed in regard to the that has been stated in these lines.[Blogger]

"The Act does not define “permanent impairment” beyond the noted reference in s. 153 to a “permanent anatomical deficit”. The Regulations are also silent beyond confirming in s. 36 that compensation for permanent impairment is to be determined on the basis of Appendix B. In turn, Appendix B does not specifically address conditions akin to those suffered by the claimant, save as noted above. Thus, the literal rule for statutory interpretation is not applicable and the aforementioned terms must be given the ordinary meanings ascribed thereto in dictionaries, including medical and legal dictionaries, where applicable.

[See: Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2d ed. (Cowansville: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc., 1991), at 219 and 237.] The court referred to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973),Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 26th ed. (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1995) and Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999) to arrive at the meaning of ‘permanent disability’]"

Chernoff v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2002 SKQB 383 (CanLII)

Presumption Against Intending What Is Inconvenient Or Unreasonable

The opening paragraph of c. 10 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed. (1969), p. 199, reads:

“Construction Most Agreeable To Justice And Reason

“1. Presumption Against Intending What Is Inconvenient Or Unreasonable

“In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. ‘An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available.’ Where to apply words literally would ‘defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result’ we must ‘do some violence to the words’ and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. The question of inconvenience or unreasonableness must be looked at in the light of the state of affairs at the date of the passing of the statute, not in the light of subsequent events.”

Rokanas v. Co-operative Fire and Casualty Company, 1976 CanLII 244 (BC S.C.)

The presumption is amplification of another presumption that states that  Parliament/legislature acts reasonably.There appears to be no material difference between the two.The earlier presumption appears at the link given below.[blogger] 
Link for Presumption that Parliament Acts reasonably

Rules of Interpretation-Summed up By Pierre-Andre Cote

Pierre-André Côté, a professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal in his book The Interpretation of Laws, 3th edition., writes on page 364:

 "Elmar A. Driedger, in particular, has rejected the rule of the plain meaning of texts advocating, in all cases, an interpretative approach that goes beyond the text. He contrasted the three "rules" classics (Literal Rule, Golden Rule and Mischief Rule) what 'he called the "modern principle" of interpretation:

                        "Today, Next Today, there is only one principle or approach, we must read the terms of a law in their entire context, the grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the spirit of the law, The purpose of the Act and legislative intent. "This passage, often quoted with approval by members of the country's highest court, rejected the idea clear that the interpretation may consider only the terms of the law ... "

 [16] And the author Pierre-André Côté writes on page 369:

                        "... We must always consider the context, purpose and circumstances to determine the contextual meaning of a phrase (as opposed to mean" virtual "to mean" dictionary "or under" ordinary grammatical).

[17] And the professor side continues on page 377:

"The emphasis placed by the courts on the apparent intention (that is to say that the manifest, a typical reader, the text read in its global context) is justified, especially since this seems to be a condition sine qua non of an effective order organized by general standards predetermined. We must not oppose the intent litigant, some authentic it is, he had no way to deduce the text regarded in its context of utterance. A court may in its task of interpretation, add to the statute terms that are not implied. It should not, even in the name of the true intent (in so far as we can find out the text), wrong expectations that a defendant could have formed because of the way the text is written and the context of its utterance. "

[18] And the professor side continues on page 378:

            "If I have seemed far supports the idea that one should look for in the text is that I think entirely appropriate to emphasize the apparent intent of the legislature. By cons, it must criticize this directive if it is used to separate form from its context and, in particular, to exclude consideration of the objectives of the Act as part of the context might shed light on the meaning of the phrase ... "

[19] And he concludes, at page 379:

            "Words simply reflect the intent: it must not become an end in itself. If, despite the factual errors, blunders or editorial weaknesses inherent in this tool is language, the intention is clear clearly, the judge should give effect. "

[20] The Supreme Court decision in The Queen v. Hassel Wander, [1993] 2 SCR, Judge Cory wrote at page 413:

            "The rule of strict construction becomes applicable only when attempts at neutral interpretation proposed in the art. 12 of the Interpretation Act remain after a reasonable doubt as to the meaning or scope of the text of the law. As noted by Professor Côté, this means that even in the case of criminal laws, must be sought true legislative intent and apply the meaning that corresponds to its objects. "

Cited from:  Quebec (Attorney General of the province) c. Franquelin (Municipality), 2001 CanLII 11435 (QC CS)

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