3.06.2010

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Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Strict Application of Literal Rule

Strict literal interpretation : Justification Thereof

As some authors have put , the justification for the Strict Literal approach is as follows:

  • it encourages careful drafting of legislation, as legislators know that their words will be read strictly;
  • it allows judges to be seen as non-political, as they don't have to interpret according to policy;
  • it accords well with the notion of ParliamentarySupremacy. If judges are encouraged to read statutes too freely this may be seen as a usurpation of the powers of the elected representatives of the people (in fact, this happens anyway).
  • Because it essential that the wording of the statute includes some generalizations, their application to a particular object or situation may be difficult to determine. For example, in AllenVEmmersonAndOthers1944 the point in question was whether the term ``theatres and other places of public entertainment'' should apply to a fun-fair. The Act itself was unhelpful on this point.
  • The wording may be unamiguous, but contradictory or absurd. In R v Allen (1872), a case of bigamy, the wording of the legislation at the time defined bigamy as being married twice. Since the second attempt at marriage would be void it would be impossible, on such a definition, to commit bigamy. The wording of the legislation was perfectly clear, but absurd.
  • It offers little protection against the exploitation of technical loop-holes. For example, in Whitley v Chappell ([1868] 4 LRQB 147), it was held that as a dead person was not entitled to vote, impersonating a dead person did not constitute impersonating a person entitled to vote.
  • It does not allow the court to extend common-sense to specific cases whose factors were not envisaged by the legislature. For example, in R v Harris (1836) it was held that a man who had bitten another man's nose off was not guilty of an offense that required him to "stab, cut or wound". A strict application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius meant that things related to stabbing, cutting or wounding, but not those specific acts, had to be excluded.
  • Purposive approaches allow the courts to given effect to the intention of Parliament, even when the exact words don't allow for this.
  • An acceptance of purposive intepretation allows the court to seek authority outside the exact words of the statute; such an approach is not only forbidden until a literal reading, it would be meaningless.

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