W. N. Eskridge[1] observed that:
Sstatutory interpretation theory is distinct from, and intellectually independent of, common law and constitutional theory. For example, statutory interpretation involves much richer authoritative texts than common law or constitutional interpretation. . . . More than common law or constitutional interpretation, statutory interpretation is a holistic enterprise, permitting deep involvement of the interpreter in the structure and history of a statutory text, as well as its formal relation to other statutory provisions.
In the second Sir Ninian Stephen Lecture delivered on 10 March 1993, the Honourable Justice McHugh of the High Court of Australia said:
"Legislation is the cornerstone of the modern legal system." His Honour emphasised the centrality of the law of statutory interpretation to the functions of the profession and the judiciary. The overwhelming majority of cases in the Courts require reference to statutory provisions. Something in the order of half of all cases require the Court to construe a statute. The constitutional significance of statutory interpretation should also be noted. A number of the rules of construction, to which I will refer, make it clear that the common law's protection of fundamental rights and liberties is secreted within the law of statutory interpretation. How do we select the meaning of words capable of application at different levels of generality? That is to say, when Parliament uses general words does it intend to encompass everything that is capable of falling within them? This is a formulation that I have adopted from Lord Simon of Glaisdale. In a case concerned with the meaning of the word "premises" in the British Rent Act 1968, his Lordship said:
"Statutory language, like all language, is capable of an almost infinite gradation of 'register' - i.e. it will be used at the semantic level appropriate to the subject matter and to the audience addressed (the man in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc). It is the duty of a court of construction to tune in to such register and so to interpret the statutory language as to give to it the primary meaning which is appropriate in that register (unless it is clear that some other meaning must be given in order to carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid injustice, anomaly, absurdity or contradiction). In other words statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances."
Lord Simon of Glaisdale returned to this issue in a subsequent case where his Lordship said:
"If a court of construction places itself in the position of the draftsman, acquires his knowledge, recognises his statutory objectives, tunes into his linguistic register, and then ascertains the primary and natural meaning in their context of the words he has used, that will generally be an end of the task of construction. But occasionally something will go wrong. It may become apparent that the primary and natural meaning cannot be what Parliament intended: it produces injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, or it stultifies or runs counter to the statutory objective."
No comments:
Post a Comment