chapter-9 part 5

Literal

" Although this proposition is generally true, "the literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to the manifest purposes that, in light of the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole.[1]"Obviously whether in this case the ‘literal rule’ of interpretation have been applied or not is not clear. What is clear is that the plain thrust is on the object of the Act and the legislative intention which the Hon’bl judge is finding to discover.It has been argued by many scholars that we should switch over from the intentionalism to the statute oriented approach because that is the only tangible thing evidencing the enactment. ‘Legislative intent’ probably cannot be discovered as it represents the collective thought process of the legislature when the Statute was enacted.It may be difficult to find out the illusive intention of the legislature,.Even in finding so the use of extrinsic aids will have to be resorted to. The extrinsic aid material is also not relied by the courts as an aid to the interpretation of the statute.There are ofcourse varying opinion. Yet it is for ,sure, that the statute is the best piece from which one can discover anything which the legislature had in mind. The legislative intent should be discovered from the statute and besides this other extraneous factors like the socio-political environment and the society etc, can throw some light on the statute as well. However, this sort of an exercise is to be conducted with great caution lest it results into judge making an Act.

"It is very desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of an Act of Parliament, giving to them the sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed[2]". "If the words of an Act are clear you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity[3]" Therefore if absurdity does arise, or if such an interpretation produces injustice, the remedy lies in the hands of Parliament; devotees of the literal rule maintain that it is not for judges to usurp (what they call) the function of Parliament: "It is infinitely better to adhere to the words of an Act of Parliament and leave the legislature to set it right than to alter these words according to one's notion of an absurdity[4]", per Lord Bramwell. Higgins J - examination of language in Act as whole - but once find what language means,in ordinary or natural sense, apply it even if result inconvenient/impolitic/improbable.[5] but contrast Gibbs CJ - not insist on too literal an interpretation, or deny that court should seek real intentionStephen J - other sections amended, this one not - this section an ‘anachronism’ - literal interpretation would defeat object of Act, so not applied[6]Mason, Wilson JJ - inconvenience/improbability assists court to conclude that construction that is ‘reasonably open’ is to be preferred to literal one proper to depart from literal reading , where it does not conform to legislative intent as discerned from provisions, including policy as discerned from provisions” if 2 competing interpretations, advantage with interpretation which produces ‘fairer and more convenient operation’, as long as conforms to legislative intention”But if one interpretation has a powerful advantage of ordinary meaning and grammatical sense, only displaced if operation seen to be unintended.”

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[1] Silver v. Brown (1966) 63. 2d 841, 845; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 849.

[2] R v Inhabitants of Ramsgate (1827) 6 B&C 712, per Bayley, J

[3] R v The Judges of the City of London Court [1892] 1 QB 273, 290

[4] Hill v East and West India Dock Co (1884)9 App Cas 448

[5] Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (HC) (1920)

[6] Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (HC) (1981)