One interprets the statute by reading it as a whole to find out as to how the statute would operate.
The task appears to be simple but due to the imperfection of the language employed and the difference in the approach of the draftsmen and the interpreter there may be the possibility of inferring something that is not meant to be the purpose and object of the Statute. No language is so perfect that it can convey the thoughts of human beings. It is a borrowed and also extrinsic means of conveying thoughts of the legislature. The thoughts of the legislature are converted by the draftsmen into words and the words so employed are used for interpreting the thoughts of the legislature. This may result in some discrepencies at the two ends due to different meaning that may be assigned to the words at the both ends. Thus on account of imperfection of language as a media for transporting the thoughts, the words employed may convey what was not intended to be conveyed resulting into the need of interpretation. Secondly the need may arise on account of selection of the words which when put in the sentence may result in the meaning of the provisions that was not intended to be. On account of the approach at the two ends i.e. of translator and the interpreter the resultant may be something that is either ambiguous or absurd results. To resolve this conflict[1] the aids to interpretation are resorted to. Many words have been standardised in the process so that these when used in the text of statute always convey the same meaning that is uniform. This has facilitated the debugging as to what is intended to be conveyed, nonetheless, all the words cannot be standardised.
Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context. The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the 'intention of Parliament' is an objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or other persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is it the subjective intention of the draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual members of either House. These individuals will often have widely varying intentions. Their understanding of the legislation and the words used may be impressively complete or woefully inadequate. Thus, when courts say that such-and-such a meaning 'cannot be what Parliament intended', they are saying only that the words under consideration cannot reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning.
As Lord Reid[2] said :
'We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used.'[COMMENTS]
As per Lord Hoffman [3]there is ultimately only one principle of construction, namely to ascertain what Parliament meant by using the language of the statute. All other ‘principles of construction’ can be no more than guides which past judges put forward, some more insightful than others, to assist in the task of interpretation .A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is the plain meaning rule, namely that where the legal meaning is plain it must be followed. In Barnard v Gorman[4] at 48D Viscount Simon L.C. commented on the duty of judges in interpreting statutes thus: our duty is to take the words as they stand to give them their true construction, having regard to the language of the whole section, and as far as relevant, of the whole Act always preferring the natural meaning of the word involved, but none the less always giving the word its appropriate construction according to the context.It seems, then, that other principles of statutory interpretation should only be invoked where the words of the statute are ambiguous[5].
In identifying the meaning of the words used, the courts employ accepted principles of interpretation as useful guides. For instance, an appropriate starting point is that language is to be taken to bear its ordinary meaning in the general context of the statute. Another, recently enacted, principle is that so far as possible legislation must be read in a way which is compatible with human rights and fundamental freedoms[6].
[1]Emphasizing the clarity in the words it has been observed that’ Unless parliamentary statements are indeed clear and unequivocal (or, as Lord Reid put it in Reg. v. Warner [1969] 2 AC 256 at 279E, such as "would almost certainly settle the matter immediately one way or the other"), the court is likely to be drawn into comparing one statement with another, appraising the meaning and effect of what was said and considering what was left unsaid and why. In the course of such an exercise the court would come uncomfortably close to questioning the proceedings in Parliament contrary to article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 and might even violate that important constitutional prohibition.’
[2] Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A G [1975] AC 591, 613:
[3] Macniven (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] 1 ALL ER 865 at 874 [29]
[4] Barnard v Gorman [1941] 3 ALL ER 45
[5]Quoted In: Cable & Wireless (Barbados) Ltd. V Fair Trading Commission Et Al. [2003] Bbsc 23 (20 November 2003)
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