3.06.2010

free counters

The most comprehensive coverage on the construction of Statutes. It includes parts of statutes,Extrinsic-Aids,Intrinsic aids, Reading down, Amendments,Repeals,codifications,Quasi-Judicial agencies,Non-obstante clause,Mandatory/Declatory provisions,Tax ,Beneficial, Criminal,Fiscal Statute's Interpretation and sub-ordinate legislations.Besides it contains the Rules of Interpretation and the Role of Judiciary.Citations are in abundance.



Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Removal of Ambiguity: Primary Role of Interpretation

Meaning of Ambiguity
1.Statutory ambiguity cannot be determined by referring to the parties' interpretations of the statute. Of course their interpretations differ. That is why they are in court. See Bank of America NT & SA v. 203 North Lasalle Street P'ship[1999] USSC 31; , 526 U.S. 434, 461 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("A mere disagreement among litigants over the meaning of a statute does not prove ambiguity; it usually means that one of the litigants is simply wrong."). Whether a statute is ambiguous is a pure question of law to be determined by the courts, however, not by the parties or by an administrative agency. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, [1995] USSC 65; 515 U.S. 347, 369 (1995) (finding that interpretation of statutory terms is a question of law and is therefore the court's duty); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 (holding that courts must decide "pure question[s] of statutory construction").
It was also noted in this case:'Second, it is not unheard of for a court to find that an agency interpretation is not reasonable. See, e.g., Solid Waste, 121 S. Ct. at 683 (declining to extend Chevron deference to agency interpretation); SEC v. Sloan, [1978] USSC 78; 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (same). We have offered several reasons why the agency interpretation in this case is unreasonable. A statute is ambiguous, however, only if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. DeGeorge v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Central Dist. of California, 219 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2000). Such is not the case here'.[2001] USCA9 284
The dictionary meaning or the word "interpretation" is "the action of interpreting or explaining: explanation, exposition". And the word interpret is defined as "to expound the meaning of (something abstruse or mysterious); to . render (words, writings or author, etc.) clear or explicit; to elucidate, to explain". In fact one of the first examples given in the use of the word is "interpretation of Nature" a phrase used by Bacon to denote the discovery of natural laws by means of induction. It will be observed that these meanings are consonant with what we understand by the term `interpretation' in the legal sphere.
Courts when called upon to interpret statutes and documents are permitted to look at extraneous material. The functions of a court cannot be equated to that of a mechanical instrument which merely reproduces faithfully and impersonally something that has been pre-recorded. It is now generally admitted that courts have and often do 'play a creative role in exercise of their functions. If authority is needed to show the use of this term in its wider context, one has only to think of cases like Heydon's case or of statutes and reputed texts which recognise the right of a court to admit extrinsic material in aid of. interpretation. In such contexts we find that the term interpretation is used to describe that exercise[1].
The word “ambiguity” is itself ambiguous. It is not necessarily limited to situations of verbal ambiguity and grammatical or syntactical ambiguity. The word ambiguity is often used in a more general sense of indicating any situation in which the scope and applicability of a particular statute is, for whatever reason, doubtful[2]. For those who find comfort in the “plain meaning” rule, it is necessary to recognise, in the words of Lord Wilberforce, that general words do not necessarily have a “plain meaning[3]
Where the meaning of a statute is plain, its language clear and unambiguous, and there is no uncertainty or doubt of the legislative intent, there is no need for construction and the courts should not indulge in it. If the words of the statute, given their ordinary and popular meaning, are reasonably free from uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascertain the legislative intent.In construing a statute, the first step is to examine the language for ambiguity. The courts should follow the language used and fide its plain meaning, whatever the courts feels about the wisdom, expediency or policy of the Act. Exception is found where the plain meaning will lead to absurd results.

However, the word "ambiguity" itself, perhaps ironically enough, is not without its own difficulty. Frequently, in the context of statutory interpretation, the word "ambiguity" is used in a more general sense. It is applied, not only to situations in which a word has more than one meaning, but to any situation in which the intention of Parliament with respect to the scope of a particular statutory situation is, for whatever reason, doubtful.
Donaldson J described the role of the courts in a following manner:
“The duty of the Courts is to ascertain and give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In the performance of this duty the Judges do not act as computers into which are fed the statutes and the rules for the construction of statutes and from whom issue forth the mathematically correct answer. The interpretation of statutes is a craft as much as a science and the judges as craftsmen, select and apply the appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. They are not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing”.[4]


[1] Vide Phipson : Evidence, 8 th Edn., Chapter XLVI.
[2] Australian Bar Review supra at 231-232; Repatriation Commissioner v Vietnam Veterans Association of NSW Branch (2000) 24 NSWLR 548 at 116.
[3] Repatriation Commission v Vietnam Veterans’ Association (2000) 48 NSWLR 548 at [116].
[4]Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc. [1968] 3 WLR 714 at 732.

1 comment:

  1. Thank you. Nice to see the fine dictum of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, sadly overlooked by the international tribunals.

    ReplyDelete

Blog Archive