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Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Parliamentary Debates...Contd...II

As regards the judgment of this Court, delivered by Costello, P, in The People (D.P.P.) -v- McDonagh [1] the Appellants have relied on the following observations in that judgment; “ It has long been established that a Court may, as an aid to the construction of a statute or one of its provisions, consider its legislative history, a term which includes the legislative antecedents of the provisions under construction as well as pre-parliamentary material relating to it ”. First of all I would observe that in that case no reliance was placed on or consideration given to parliamentary debates nor indeed to any history of the Act in issue before the Oireachtas. The observations, therefore, must be regarded as obiter. I also agree with the observations of Geoghegan, J. in his judgment in the High Court in this case where he stated “ The passage from the judgment of Costello, P. which I have cited begins with the words It has long been established...’. Quite clearly it has not been long established in Ireland that a Minister’s statement could be used in aid of construction. I do not think that Costello, P. had that in mind at all when he used that expression ”. Of course, one can conclude from the passage cited, as Geoghegan J. went on to remark, that Costello, P. was of the view that in certain circumstances such a ministerial statement could now be relied upon. That however, was obiter.[2]

In counterpoint to the submissions made on behalf of the Appellants, the Respondents relied on the dictum of Walsh J. in The People (D.P.P.) -v- Quilligan[3] where he stated “ Whatever may have been in the minds of the members of the Oireachtas when the legislation was passed ...” their intention must be deduced ‘ from the words of the statute ”. Furthermore, in Howard -v- Commissioner of Public Works in Ireland [4], although the admissibility of debates in the Oireachtas was not directly in issue, Finlay, C.J. stated that “... it would not be permissible to interpretate a statute upon the basis of either speculation or indeed, even of actual information obtained with regard to the belief of individuals who either drafted the statute or took part as legislators in its enactment with regard to the question of the appropriate legal principles applicable to matters being dealt with in the statute

In that case also Blayney, J. (with whom Finlay, C.J agreed) endorsed the rule expressed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edition p.28) to the effect that “ it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law ”.

Clearly a great deal of weight must be given to all the judicial views expressed on this question which underline that the issue here involves serious questions of judicial policy concerning the interpretation of statutes.

It seems that there is a long-established practice in the United States, in spite of occasional dissents such as those cited from Justice Jackson, (and currently Justice Scalia) of considering a wide variety of legislative materials including congressional debates. It does not appear that the Supreme Court justices are conscious of the existence of any rule of law to the contrary. This emerges most clearly from the full context of the passage of which part was cited by Costello P in McDonagh from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v American Trucking Association [5]:

The Supreme Court of India has observed that:

The relevance of the parliamentary debate or the speech of the Minister has been highlighted by this Court in many cases. It is a settled position in law that there can be only limited use of the parliamentary debate. The Courts should not normally critically analyse the proceedings of Parliament.

This flows from a very fundamental aspect i.e. mutual respect of the Parliament and the Judiciary for each other. Each of these great institutions in a democracy operates in different fields. It is not expected that one wing of democracy would criticize the manner of functioning of another wing. That would be against the basic desirability of mutual respect. Any opinion or comment or criticism about the manner of functioning of one by the other would be not only undesirable but imperatively avoidable. The citizens of this country expect a great deal from the Parliament and the Judiciary. It is but natural that the people of this country would be disappointed and dis-heartened and their hopes will be shattered if instead of showing respect for each other, there is mudslinging, unwanted criticism or impermissible criticism about the manner of functioning or the rationale of a decision or a view taken. In this context, it would be relevant to take note of what this Court said in Builders Association of India v. Union of India and Ors. (1995 Supp (1) SCC 41), and K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1985 (1) SCC 523).

In State of Mysore v. R.V. Bidap (1974 (3) SCC 337), it was observed as follows:

"5. Anglo-American jurisprudence, unlike other systems, has generally frowned upon the use of parliamentary debates and press discussions as throwing light upon the meaning of statutory provisions. Willes, J. in Miller v. Tayler, [1769] 4 Burri, 2303, 2332., stated that the sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the House where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other House or to the Sovereign. In Assam Railways and Trading Company Ltd. v. I.R.C., [1935] A.C. 445 at p. 458, Lord Writ in the Privy Council said :

"It is clear that the language of a Minister of the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure which eventually becomes law is inadmissible and the report of commissioners is even more removed from value as evidence of intention, because it does not follow that their recommendations were accepted."[Cited from:ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS [2008] INSC 614 (10 April 2008)]



[1] The People (D.P.P.) -v- McDonagh [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 469

[2]See: Crilly v. T. & J. Farrington Ltd. [2001] IESC 60; [2002] 1 ILRM 161 (11 July 2001) [Ireland]
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2001/60.htm

[3] The People (D.P.P.) -v- Quilligan (No. 1) [1986] I.R. 496 , 511

[4] Howard -v- Commissioner of Public Works in Ireland [1993] I.R. 101

[5] United States v American Trucking Association (1940) US 534 at p 543-544

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