English Authorities and principles
"It is well-established that the common law of England is that the King's prerogative is illustrated by the rule that the Sovereign is not necessarily bound by a statutory law which binds the subject. This is further enforced by the rule that the King is not bound by a statute unless he is expressly named or unless he is bound by necessary implication or unless, the statute being for the public good, it would be absurd to exclude the King from it." [Director of Rationing and' Distribution v. The Corporation of Calcutta, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 158 177
"That was law applicable to India also, as authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in the case referred to above [(1946) L. R. 73 I.A. 271)]...... it (law in force under Art. 372 of the Constitution) must be interpreted as including the common law of England which was adopted as the law of this country before the Constitution came into force." (At p.173).]
Sinha, C.J., therefore, held that the said rule of construction was, part of the common law of England, that it was adopted by this, country and that Art' 372 of the Constitution continued it. Sarkar, J., on the other hand, agreed with the conclusion arrived at by Sinha, C.J., but on a different ground. He based his conclusion not on any common law doctrine, but simply on the ground that the said rule of construction of statutory provisions was accepted and followed in England, America and India. Wanchoo, J., in his dissent, put the case in a different perspective. The following, passage brings out his line of thought :
"Two things are clear from this modern conception of royal prerogative, namely (1) that there must be a Crown or King to whom the royal prerogative attaches, and (2) that the prerogative must be part of the common law of England. Both these conditions existed when the Privy Council decision in Province1 of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay(1) was given in October 1946; the King was still there and the Privy Council held that the English common law rule of construc- tion applied to Indian legislation as much as to English ,statutes." (At p. 184).
"In our country the Rule of Law prevails and our Constitution has guaranteed it by the provisions contained in Part III thereof as well as by other provisions in other Parts...... It is to my mind inherent in the conception of the Rule of Law that the State, no less than its citizens and others, is bound by the laws of the land. When the King as the embodiment of all power-executive, legislative and judicial-has disappeared and in our republican Constitution, sovereign power has been distributed among various organs created 'thereby, it seems, to me that there is neither justification nor necessity for continuing the rule of construction based on the royal, prerogative." (At p. 185).
"But where the royal prerogative is merely a rule of construction of statutes based on the existence of the Crown in England and for historical reasons, I fail to see why in a democratic republic, the courts should not follow the ordinary principle of construction that no one is exempt from the operation of a statute unless the statute expressly grants the exemption or the exemption arises by necessary implication." (At pp. 188-189).
The conflict between the two views expressed by the learned Judges in the earlier decision mainly rests on the meaning of the expression "law in force" in Art. 372 of the Constitution. While Sinha, C.J., took the view that the common law of England, including the rule of construction, was accepted as the law of this country and was, therefore, the law in force within the meaning of the said Article, Wanchoo, J., took the view that whatever might be said of the substantive laws, 'a rule of construction adopted by the common law of England and accepted by the Privy Council at a time when the Crown was functioning in India, was not the law in force within the meaning of the said Article.
American Decisions
Some of the American decisions may usefully be referred to at this stage. It was said that in America where the Crown did not exist, the same rule of construction was adopted in that country as law of the land and therefore by analogy the same legal position must be accepted in India.
The decision in H. Snowden Marshall v. People of the State of New York(1) only lays down that the State of New York has the common law prerogative right of priority over unsecured creditors. This case has nothing to do with the rule of construction but was based upon the common law prerogative of the (1920) 65 L.cd. 315.Crown expressly embodied in the State's Constitution. The decision in Guarantee Trust Company of New York v. United States of America(1) accepted the immunity of the sovereign from he operation of statutes of limitation. That decision was based upon the doctrine of public policy evolved by courts, though in evolving the said policy the courts had been influenced, to some extent, by the doctrine of the pregrogative of the Crown. This decision also does not express any opinion on the rule of construction.
The decision in United States of America v. United Mine Workers of America ruled that statutes which in general terms, divested pre-existing rights and privileges would not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect. But Frankfurter, J., after citing the said rule, pointed out that "At best, this canon, like other generalities about statutory construction, is not a rule of law." The same rule was again re-stated in United States of America v. Reginald P. Wittek.
The question there was whether the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act did not apply to Government-owned defence houses in the District such as Bellevue Houses. The Court relied not only upon the said rule of construction but also on other circumstances in support of the conclusion that the United States was exempt from the operation of that Act by necessary implication. In Jess Larson, as War Assets Administrator and Surplus Property Administrator v. Domestic and Foreign,, Commerce Corporation, the purchaser of surplus coal from the War Assets Administration filed a suit against the said Administration for an injunction prohibiting the latter from selling or delivering the coal to any other person. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the sovereign immunity in suits for injunction or for specific performance was based upon public policy. But it was argued that the principle of sovereign immunity was an archaic hangover not consonant with modern morality; the majority conceded that there was substance in such a viewpoint as applied to suits for damages. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent went further and pointed out that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was in disfavour. The American decisions, therefore, were mainly based either on the provisions of the constitution of the State or on. the ground of public policy evolved by Courts. The founding fathers carried with them the English doctrine of the Crown Prerogative and it continued to influence some of the principles of public policy evolved in that country. Even so, the decisions made it clear that the rule of construction was relied upon only as one of the guides to arrive at the intention of a particular statute.
That apart, the fact that the common law of England pertaining to prerogatives influenced some of the decisions of the Supreme Court, of the United States cannot help us in coming to a conclusion whether the said rule had become part of the Law in India.
