Words must Be read In context

There is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously, with the scheme of the act, the object of the act and the intention of Parliament.

Stubert Investments Limited vs. Her Majesty the Queen (phonetic) 1984 CanLII 20 (S.C.C.), (1984) 1 S.C.R. 536, at 578,

Cited from

Westbank Indian band development Co. Ltd. v. Kelowna, 1991 CanLII 1445 (BC S.C.)
In another case where the court was considering the meaning of Section 13(2) of the Unemployment Insurance Act,[Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. U-1 , ss. 6(1) (as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 5), (2) (as am. idem), 7(1) (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 14, s. 1), (3) (as am. idem), (6) (as enacted idem), (7) (as enacted idem), 9(1), 13, 14 (as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 10), 17 (as am. idem, s. 11), 24 (as am. idem, s. 17).] it was observed that: "I do not understand the Commission to be suggesting that we should adopt a strict or literal construction of subsection XXXX or that we should interpret it in isolation. That would indeed be a vain attempt. It is well-settled law that the words of a statute must be read in their total context and with proper regard to the purpose and intent of Parliament as expressed in the statute. It is only in cases of ambiguity, however, that a court needs to look beyond the ordinary meaning and normal construction of the words used by Parliament. "

From the above it is clear that there is a shift from literal approach to Contextual and Modern/ Or Modern Purposive approach.The position is well settled in Canada.{blogger]The words are not to be seen in  isolation but should be given the contextual meaning keeping the object of the statute.[Blogger] Canada v. Cymerman, [1996] 2 F.C. 593 That the so-called "literal rule"does not today confine the judge to a sterile grammatical analysis of the actual words which he is called upon to interpret has been emphasised by Lord Somervell in Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [I957] A.C. 436 at p. 473. where he said:

"Is it unreal to proceed as if the court looked first at the provision in dispute without  knowing whether it was contained in a Finance Act or a Public Health Act. The title and general scope of the Act constitute the background of the context. When a court comes to the Act itself, bearing in mind any relevant extraneous matters, thcre is, in my opinion, one compelling rule. The whole or any part of the Act may be referred to and relied on. It is, I hope, not disrespectful to regret that the subject was not left where Sir John Nicholl left it in 1826. 'The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law – it is the "animus imponentis", the intention of the lawmaker, expressed in the law itself taken as a whole. Hence, to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, that particular phrase is not to be viewed, detached from its context in the statute: it is to be viewed in connexion with its whole context – meaning by this as well the title and preamble as the purview or enacting part of the statute '

 [(Sir John Nicholl in Brett v. Brett) "(1826) 3 Add. 210 at p. 216

In the same case [1957] A.C. 436 at p. 461.]  Viscount Simonds said:

" . . . words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use 'context' in its widest sense, which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy." 

In a later passage [At p. 463. ] Viscount Simonds referred to 

“the elementary rule . . . that no one should profess to understand any part of a statute or of any other document before he had read the whole of it. Until he has done so he is not entitled to say that it or any part of it is clear or unambiguous."

Literal/plain Meaning Rule

The Plain meaning rule, also known as the literal rule, is a type of statutory construction, which dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute unless a statute explicitly defines some of its terms otherwise. In other words, the law is to be read word for word and should not divert from its true meaning. It is the mechanism that underlines textualism and, to a certain extent, originalism.

What is Plain Meaning Rule

To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include "definitions" sections within a statute, which explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term. The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself.

According to the plain meaning rule, absent a contrary definition within the statute, words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal meaning. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law means.

Prof. Larry Solum's Legal Theory Lexicon expands on this premise:

Some laws are meant for all citizens (e.g., criminal statutes) and some are meant only for specialists (e.g., some sections of the tax code). A text that means one thing in a legal context, might mean something else if it were in a technical manual or a novel. So the plain meaning of a legal text is something like the meaning that would be understood by competent speakers of the natural language in which the text was written who are within the intended readership of the text and who understand that the text is a legal text of a certain type.

Lord Evershed was echoing the same point: 'The length and detail of modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule.'

If the statute was long, this suggested that parliament had expressed its full meaning and that there was no need or scope to imply any additional meanings. Anything omitted was a casus omissus which the judge could not supply because that would amount to legislation. But the literal approach was used equally for wills, contracts, and other legal documents, so that the philosophy was by no means based exclusively on the constitutional relationship between courts and parliament nor on the growing length of statutes.

The plain meaning approach cannot survive modern hermeneutic understandings of how we read texts. No words are simply "plain in themselves." The words are just scratches on a page. They are said to be plain only because the interpreter is deciding to treat them as such and giving a particular connotation to them, a connotation that the judge claims to be the connotation intended by the legislator. The judge in dividing up the words into plain categories or ambiguous categories is really doing so by supplying a context and assigning a connotation, even unconsciously, for the words. Professor Zander summarizes the criticisms as follows at 49:

But the literal rule has also been subjected to severe criticism:

(l) The most fundamental objection to the rule is that it is based on a false premise, namely that words have plain, ordinary meanings apart from their context. Professor H.L.A. Hart of Oxford has argued that a word has a core meaning 'or standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application' even though at the edges there is a margin of uncertainty. But Professor Lon Fuller has contested this by urging that meaning attaches not to individual words but to sentences and paragraphs, and that 'surely a paragraph does not have a "standard instance" that remains constant whatever the context in which it appears.' If a statute seems to have a core meaning 'this is because we can see that, however one might formulate the precise objective of the statute, this case would still come within it.'

(2) Those who apply the literal approach often talk of using the 'dictionary meaning' of the words in question, but dictionaries normally provide a number of alternative meanings.

(3) The plain-meaning approach cannot be used for general words, which are obviously capable of bearing several meanings.

(4) Not infrequently the courts say that the meaning of the words is 'plain' but then disagree as to their interpretations.

(5) The plain-meaning theory may be acceptable outside the courtroom, since it could be true that a high proportion of statutory materials and other legal documents can in fact be interpreted without recourse to any mischief or golden rule.

Go Next Page ...Contd.....

Chapter 9 Literal/Plain Meaning Approach

Chapter 9

Literal/Plain Meaning Approach

.The Literal/plain meaning Rule of interpretation

When interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of its language[1]as Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal[2].Basically The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature[3]. and ,

“[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,[4]’ also,’ If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we enforce it as plainly written. However, if a statue is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must engage in judicial construction and interpret the statute’[5]. It is to be seen that ‘A statute that is unambiguous on its face may be rendered ambiguousby its interaction with and its relation to other statutes’[6]

We also follow that :

“The words, which are used in declaring the meaning of other words may also need interpretation and the legislature may use a word in the same statute in several different senses. In that view of the matter, it would not be correct to contend that the expression as defined in the interpretation clause would necessarily carry the same meaning throughout the statute”[7] as ‘the well-accepted principle of statutoryconstruction that requires every provision of a statute to be given effect”[8]

In the case of Technical Words ‘It is no doubt true that normally a technical meaning should be attributed rather than a common meaning to a word if the same relates to a particular trade, business or profession, art or science or words having a special meaning’.[9].

---

[1] , see United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1034-35, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997)

[2]  People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 557; 534 NW2d 183(1995). 

[3] People v Morris, 450 Mich 316,326; 537 NW2d 842 (1995).

[4] see Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L,.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).

[5] People v Morris, 450 Mich 316,326; 537 NW2d 842 (1995).

[6] Peoplev Denio, 454 Mich 691, 699; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).

[7] Appeal (civil) 7533 of 1997Indian Handicrafts Emporium Vs.Union of India., Judgement 27/08/2003

[8] 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794 at 44.[part citation is given]

[9] Union of India vs. Garware Nylons Ltd. [AIR 1996 SC 3509 and Unwin vs. Hanson [1891 (2) QB 115]

Chapter-4 The English Law and Parliamentary Debates Part-4-18

Chapter-4

The English Law and Parliamentary Debates

Part-4-18

The English common law rule against the use of parliamentary debates in the interpretation of a statute was considerably eroded by the case of Pepper v Hart . The House of Lords in that case ruled that, where the statute was ambiguous or led to an absurdity, parliamentary material, such as ministerial statements, could be used as an aid to interpretation, where the parliamentary materials relied on were clear.

The House of Lords considered that the move from an absolute literal approach to interpretation to a more purposive one, had created a climate in which the old rule of the exclusion of material from Hansard could be modified.

However, it seems clear that Pepper v Hart did not herald any sweeping aside of all exclusions of parliamentary materials. In a practice direction issued by the House of Lords in 1993, the limits of the rule in Pepper v Hart were emphasised, and it was stated that "supporting documents, including extracts from Hansard , will only be accepted in exceptional circumstances."