Statute as a whole..contd..

We cannot take one sentence, one section, or even the entire statute alone and say that it has a "plain meaning" as if there were an objective formula in the few words simply waiting to be grasped by the courts. Instead the statute must be read as a whole, taking all of its provisions and reading them in the context of the legal fabric to which they are to be applied. An interpretation that creates an admittedly anomalous result is not salved by the majority's apologia that, if we read the statute in that fashion, Congress created the anomaly. Instead the question is whether the statute read as a whole was intended by Congress to create such results. The law is not an isolated bundle of capricious and inconsistent commands by a legislature presumed to react mindlessly.[United States v Acres of Land Situated in Grenada and Yalobusha Counties Mississippi Jg [1983] A statute has to be considered as a whole and should be read accordingly.This tells us about the overall structure and object of the statute with the help of which a feasible construction is possible.Once a statute is read in this manner many things becomes obvious.The first reading will, itself inform us about the doubts and the clarification that the mind required.The successive readings sends the answer to the mind to the initial doubts.[blogger]The same principles are to be employed in case of interpretation made by the agency keeping in mind that it is the legislative intent that one is looking for and Under the formulation now familiar, when we examine the Secretary's rule interpreting a statute, we ask first whether 'the intent of Congress is clear' as to 'the precise question at issue.' " Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, [1998] USSC 13; 522 U.S. 448, ----[1998] USSC 13; , 118 S.Ct. 909, 915[1998] USSC 13; , 139 L.Ed.2d 895 (1998) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778). We use traditional tools of statutory construction to determine if Congress' intent is clear as to that precise issue. See id.; Goncalves v. Reno, [1998] USCA1 139; 144 F.3d 110, 127-28 (1st Cir.1998). Duckworth v Pratt & Whitney Inc [1998] USCA1 230; 152 F.3d 1; 135 Lab.Cas. P 33,699, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d; (BNA) 1281,; 13 NDLR P 200 (24 August 1998)
 "Statutory language, like all language, is capable of an almost infinite gradation of 'register' - i.e. it will be used at the semantic level appropriate to the subject matter and to the audience addressed (the man in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc). It is the duty of a court of construction to tune in to such register and so to interpret the statutory language as to give to it the primary meaning which is appropriate in that register (unless it is clear that some other meaning must be given in order to carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid injustice, anomaly, absurdity or contradiction). In other words statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances."[Maunsell v Olins [I9751 AC 373 at 391.]

We observe the following citations as the most authentic in this  regard[blogger]that it may not always be possible to do so."If a court of construction places itself in the position of the draftsman, acquires his knowledge, recognises his statutory objectives, tunes into his linguistic register, and then ascertains the primary and natural meaning in their context of the words he has used, that will generally be an end of the task of construction. But occasionally something will go wrong. It may become apparent that the primary and natural meaning cannot be what Parliament intended: it produces injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, or it stultifies or runs counter to the statutory objective." [Fawell v Alexander [I9771 AC 59 at 84. See also Black-Clawson lntemational Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [I9751 AC 591 at 645 per Lord Simon of Glaisdale]If, however, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. "If the agency's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a reasonable way in light of the Legislature's design, we give that reading controlling weight, even if it is not the answer 'the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.' " Regions Hosp., 118 S.Ct. at 915 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778).[Duckworth [supra]]Under the first step of the Chevron analysis, we examine the statutory language at issue using our traditional tools of statutory construction. That requires us to determine whether "the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., [1997] USSC 11; 519 U.S. 337, 117 S.Ct. 843, 846[1997] USSC 11; , 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. We employ that process to determine whether Congress has spoken, for "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778.

Back                                                                                                   Go Next ..Contd..

Back to Rules of construction Page