Presumption that Parliament does not take away the Right to Approach Courts

A passages in de Smith Woolf and Jowell on "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", which is of course the recently published 5th edition of Professor de Smith's distinguished book, edited and to a considerable extent re-written by Lord Woolf and Professor Jowell; though it certainly retains the qualities of de Smith's original work. The authors say at paragraph 5-017: 

1,"It is a common law presumption of legislative intent that access to the Queen's courts in respect of justiciable issues is not to be denied save by clear words in a statute." 

2.The House of Lords has held the same to be true in relation to the right of freedom of  expression: Attorney-General v Guardian [1987] 1 WLR 1248 per Lord Templeman at 1296F-1297F, Attorney-General v Guardian (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 283-4, and Derbyshire County Court v The Times [1993] AC 534 per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 551F-G

The following is an observation of Lord Diplock that is concerned with the reach of the High Court's power to control the conduct of arbitrators.He stated thus: 

3."The High Court's power to dismiss a pending action for want of prosecution is but an instance of a general power to control its own procedure so as to prevent its being used to achieve injustice. Such a power is inherent in its constitutional function as a court of justice. Every civilised system of government requires that the state should make available to all its citizens a means for the just and peaceful settlement of deputes between them as to their respective legal rights. The means provided are courts of justice to which every citizen has a constitutional right of access in the role of plaintiff to obtain the remedy to which he claims to be entitled in consequence of an alleged breach of his legal or equitable rights by some other citizen, the defendant."[ Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909]

R v Secretary of State, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198 concerned a prisoner whose complaint was that correspondence with his solicitor concerning litigation in which he was involved or intended to launch was being censored by the prison authorities under the Prison Rules. The Court of Appeal held that section 47(1) of the Prison Act 1952 (which empowered the Secretary of State in general terms to make rules for the regulation of prisons and the treatment of prisoners) did not authorise a rule which created an impediment to the free flow of communication between a solicitor and client about contemplated legal proceedings. At 210A-D Steyn LJ, as he then was, giving the judgment of the court, said this: 

4."It is a principle of our law that every citizen has a right of unimpeded access to a court. In Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1, 13, Lord Wilberforce described it as a 'basic right'. Even in our unwritten constitution it must rank as a constitutional right. In Raymond v Honey , Lord Wilberforce said that there was nothing in the Prison Act 1952 that conferred power to 'interfere' with this right or to 'hinder' its exercise. Lord Wilberforce said that rules which did not comply with that principle would be ultra vires. Lord Elwyn-Jones and Lord Russell of Killowen agreed... It is true that Lord Wilberforce held that the rules, properly construed, were not ultra vires. But that does not affect the importance of his observations. Lord Bridge of Harwich held that the rules in question in that case were ultra vires ... he went further than Lord Wilberforce and said that a citizen's right to unimpeded access could only be taken away by express enactment ... It seems to us that Lord Wilberforce's observations rank as the ratio decidendi of the case, and we accept that such rights can as a matter of legal principle be taken away by necessary implication."  LORD CHANCELLOR EX PARTE JOHN WITHAM, R v. [1997] EWHC Admin 237 (7th March, 1997)