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Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Chapter-5 DOCTRINE OF READING DOWN: Indian Citations Part-9.4

Chapter-5

DOCTRINE OF READING DOWN: Indian Citations
Part-9.4

It is well established principle of interpretation that ‘where the words of an Act are clear, there is no need for applying any of the principles of interpretation’ .The presumptions are to be applied in the case of ambiguity in the statute. The safer and more correct course of dealing with the question of construction is to take the words at their face value meaning without in the first place refer to cases. Where an ambiguity arises to supposed intention of the legislature, one of the statutory constructions, the court profounded is the doctrine of reading down. Lord Reid in Federal Steam Navigation Co. v. Department of Trade and Industry,[1] (as also extracted by Cross -Statutory Interpretation, Butterworths' Edition, 1976 at page 43 in preposition 3) has stated thus:

"the judge may read in words which he considers to be necessarily implied by words which are already in the statute and he has a limited power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally unreasonable, unworkable, or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."

It is hazardous for a Court to attempt to enforce what according to it is the moral value. Before embarking on the mission of "closing the gap between the law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible", it is necessary for the Court to understand clearly its limitations. The power of the Court to legislate is strictly limited. "Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and not jus dare to interpret the law, and not to make law or give law[2]".

The golden rule of statutory construction which is repeated here for the sake of reference is that the words and phrases or sentences should be interpreted according to the intent of the legislature that passed the Act. All the provisions should be read together. If the words of the statutes are in themselves precise and unambiguous, the words, or phrases or sentences themselves alone do, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words or phrases or sentences in their natural and ordinary sense. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it is always safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and have recourse to the preamble, which is a key to open the minds of the makers of the statute and the mischiefs which the Act intends to redress. In determining the meaning of statute the first question to ask always is: what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intent of the legislature, then it is proper to look for some other possible meaning and the court cannot go further.

The courts, by its very nature, are most ill suited to undertake the task of legislating. There is no machinery for the Court to ascertain the condition of the people and their requirements and to make laws that would be most appropriate. Further two judges may think that a particular law would, be desirable to meet the requirements whereas another two judges may most profoundly differ from the conclusions arrived at by two judges[3].

01.Doctrine of Reading Down as adopted By Courts

It is convenient to mention here the meaning and scope of the word 'reading down' and 'Severance' dealt with on page 7, para B in Australian Federal Constitutional Law by Colin Howard which reads as follows:

"The High Court presumes the validity of legislation to the extent that it will not of its own motion raise questions of constitutionality. Legislation is treated as valid unless the parties to litigation challenge it on constitutional grounds. The techniques of construction known as reading down and severance are corollaries of this presumption. Reading down puts into operation the principle that so far as it is reasonably possible to do so, legislation should be construed as being within power. It has the practical effect that where an Act is expressed in language of a generality which makes it capable, if read literally, of applying to matters beyond the relevant legislative power, the court will construe it in a more limited sense so as to keep it within power.”

And Further :

“It does not necessarily follow that because a statute cannot be read down it is wholly invalid. The presumption of valid- ity leads naturally to the view that where a statute cannot be held wholly valid it should be held valid at least to the extent that it is reasonably possible or practicable to do so. Where reading down is not available the court next decides where there is a case for severing the invalid parts of the statute from the parts which, standing alone, are valid. If this can be done the court declares only the invalid parts to be beyond power and leaves the remainder operative[4]

[1] Federal Steam Navigation Co. v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1974] 2 All E.R. 97 at p. 100

[2] JIT RAM SHIV KUMAR Vs.STATE OF HARYANA, 1980 AIR 1285; 1980 SCR (3) 689

[3] ibid also See: Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc.v. State of U.P., [1908] 3 SCR p. 383 followed.

[4] DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATIONVs.D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS, 1991 AIR 101, 1990 SCR Supl. (1) 142

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