It is to be borne in mind that there must be a plain meaning and the Court cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words and in that case, the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the words used and the intention of the legislation must be found out from the scheme of the Act[Consortium Self Financing v. State of TN - WP.20212 of 2007 [2007] INTNHC 2130 (2 July 2007)]
In another case we find the following argument quite convincing:
The above reasoning cannot be a justification for the Court to virtually amend the statute when the statute is plain, precise, clear and unambiguous and does not admit more than one meaning, and such a course is impermissible having due regard to the principle Casus omissus. According to this principle, a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction as held by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in large number of pronouncements starting with HANSRAJ GUPTA v. DEHRA DUN LMUSSOORIE ELECTRIC TRAMWAY CO. LTD.[ AIR 1933 PC 63]; HIRADEVI v. DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR[ AIR 1952 SC 362]; and the pronouncement in WALIRAM WAMAN HIRAY (Dr.) v. MR. JUSTICE B.LENTIN [AIR 1988 SC 2267]. Secondly, ignorance of the situation highlighted by the learned single Judge cannot be attributed to the Legislature which has enacted sub-Section (3) of Section 79. It is not for the Court to question the wisdom of the Legislature. [N. Sanjiva Rao v. The Regional Joint Director of School - W.A.No.849 of 2000 [2000] INAPHC 214 (12 September 2000). "If we were to interpret Section 10 (5) and Rule 70 (4) in the manner the respondents want this Court to do, we will enter into an arena where the courts do not normally tread. Amendment, addition or subtraction from the statue is the function of the Legislature and not of the Courts and except in a case where result of a plaint interpretation of the statute leads to extremely absurd situation or causes grave public mischief, the Court cannot rewrite the statute or make some addition or election from a statutory provision. It is also one of the well settled principles of interpretation that if the words of the statute are precise and unambiguous ten the Court must expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense because the words themselves declare the intent of the law giver."[COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL (M.P.) v. FRONTLINE SOFTWARE & SERVICES PVT. LTD. - MAIT--133/2006 [2007] INMPHC 247 (26 March 2007) Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy & Anr. Vs. State of A.P. JT 2006 (2) SC 361 to contend that where the words of statute are unambiguous and clear and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering statutory provisions.In this connection Supreme court has made a very clear statement that:"In Nasiruddin and others vs. Sita Ram Agarwal : (2003) 2 SCC 577 this Court stated the law in the following terms :- "37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression "shall or may" is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions should be mandatory in character." Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (See : : Swedish Match AB and another vs. Securities & Exchange Board, India and another : 2004 (7) Scale 158.) In High Court of Gujarat and another vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and others : (2003) 4 SCC 712 this Court held :- "35. The Court while interpreting the provision of a statute, although, is not entitled to rewrite the statute itself, is not debarred from "ironing out the creases". The court should always make an attempt to uphold the rules and interpret the same in such a manner which would make it workable.'NATHI DEVI V. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [2004] INSC 770 (17 December 2004 In para 16 of the judgment, it has quoted an excerpt from its earlier judgment in the case of Nasiruddin and others Vs. Sita Ram Agrawal (2003) 2 SCC 577, which is reproduced below:-
In another case we find the following argument quite convincing:
The above reasoning cannot be a justification for the Court to virtually amend the statute when the statute is plain, precise, clear and unambiguous and does not admit more than one meaning, and such a course is impermissible having due regard to the principle Casus omissus. According to this principle, a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction as held by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in large number of pronouncements starting with HANSRAJ GUPTA v. DEHRA DUN LMUSSOORIE ELECTRIC TRAMWAY CO. LTD.[ AIR 1933 PC 63]; HIRADEVI v. DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR[ AIR 1952 SC 362]; and the pronouncement in WALIRAM WAMAN HIRAY (Dr.) v. MR. JUSTICE B.LENTIN [AIR 1988 SC 2267]. Secondly, ignorance of the situation highlighted by the learned single Judge cannot be attributed to the Legislature which has enacted sub-Section (3) of Section 79. It is not for the Court to question the wisdom of the Legislature. [N. Sanjiva Rao v. The Regional Joint Director of School - W.A.No.849 of 2000 [2000] INAPHC 214 (12 September 2000). "If we were to interpret Section 10 (5) and Rule 70 (4) in the manner the respondents want this Court to do, we will enter into an arena where the courts do not normally tread. Amendment, addition or subtraction from the statue is the function of the Legislature and not of the Courts and except in a case where result of a plaint interpretation of the statute leads to extremely absurd situation or causes grave public mischief, the Court cannot rewrite the statute or make some addition or election from a statutory provision. It is also one of the well settled principles of interpretation that if the words of the statute are precise and unambiguous ten the Court must expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense because the words themselves declare the intent of the law giver."[COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL (M.P.) v. FRONTLINE SOFTWARE & SERVICES PVT. LTD. - MAIT--133/2006 [2007] INMPHC 247 (26 March 2007) Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy & Anr. Vs. State of A.P. JT 2006 (2) SC 361 to contend that where the words of statute are unambiguous and clear and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering statutory provisions.In this connection Supreme court has made a very clear statement that:"In Nasiruddin and others vs. Sita Ram Agarwal : (2003) 2 SCC 577 this Court stated the law in the following terms :- "37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression "shall or may" is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions should be mandatory in character." Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (See : : Swedish Match AB and another vs. Securities & Exchange Board, India and another : 2004 (7) Scale 158.) In High Court of Gujarat and another vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and others : (2003) 4 SCC 712 this Court held :- "35. The Court while interpreting the provision of a statute, although, is not entitled to rewrite the statute itself, is not debarred from "ironing out the creases". The court should always make an attempt to uphold the rules and interpret the same in such a manner which would make it workable.'NATHI DEVI V. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [2004] INSC 770 (17 December 2004 In para 16 of the judgment, it has quoted an excerpt from its earlier judgment in the case of Nasiruddin and others Vs. Sita Ram Agrawal (2003) 2 SCC 577, which is reproduced below:-
"37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of expression ''shall or may' is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions should be mandatory in character."Faujdar v. The D.D.C., Azamgarh And Others - WRIT - B No. 1056 of 2002 [2006] INAHHC 410 (6 January 2006) the rule of interpretation requires to give a literal interpretation to the statute where the language is plain and clear as it does not require any interpretation whatsoever. Adding or subtracting of any word or re-writing of the provisions could itself amount to an amendment to the Act, which is not permissible. (Vide Union of India Vs. Mohindra Supply Company, AIR 1962 SC 256; Madanlal Fakir Chandra Dudhediya Vs. Shri Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1543; Mangi Lal Vs. Sugamchand Rathi, AIR 1965 SC 101; Union of India Vs. Sankal Chand Himmat Lal Seth, AIR 1977 SC 328; Commissioner of Sales-Tax, U.P. Vs. Auriya Chambers of Commerce, Allahabad, AIR 1986 SC 1556; P.K.Unni Vs. Nirmala Industries, AIR 1990 SC 933; and Union of India Vs. Deokinandan Agarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96).Umesh Verma, Advocate v. Union of India & Another - WRIT - C No. 3253 of 1995 [2004] INAHHC 78 (17 February 2004)
In the case of Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit and others Versus State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2001) 4 SCC 534, the Apex Court held as follows:"Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinaly or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute."
There is uniformity in the judiciary world over about this type of construction
In the case of Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit and others Versus State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2001) 4 SCC 534, the Apex Court held as follows:"Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinaly or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute."
There is uniformity in the judiciary world over about this type of construction
Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court observed and criticized the Church of the Holy Trinity case on the following basis:
"Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former . . . Church ofthe Holy Trinity is cited to us whenever counsel wants us to ignore the narrow, deadening text of the statute, and pay attention to the life giving legislative intent. It is nothing but an invitation to judicial law making”
There is very popular cannon of construction that judges do not amend the statuet by adding or subtracting words in the statute[blogger]
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