Construction where Most ordinary and Natural Meaning is Not Possible

A word or phrase may have more than one meaning. This is the sense in which the word "ambiguity" is generally used.

However, the word "ambiguity" itself, perhaps ironically enough, is not without its own difficulty. Frequently, in the context of statutory interpretation, the word "ambiguity" is used in a more general sense. It is applied, not only to situations in which a word has more than one meaning, but to any situation in which the intention of Parliament with respect to the scope of a particular statutory situation is, for whatever reason, doubtful.

As the authors of the third edition of Cross on Statutory Interpretation states about ambiguity:

"In the context of statutory interpretation the word most frequently used to indicate the doubt which a judge must entertain before he can search for, and if possible, apply a secondary meaning is 'ambiguity'. In ordinary language this term is often confined to situations in which the same word is capable of meaning h o different things; but in relation to statutory interpretation, judicial usage sanctions the application of the word 'ambiguity' to describe any kind of doubtful meaning of words, phrases, or longer statutory provision." [R. Cross, Statutory Interpretation Yd Ed. London: Butterworths, 1995, at 83-84.]

A similar broad approach to the concept of "ambiguity" is reflected in a judgment of Justice O'Connor in 1906, when it was stated said:

"It has been contended in this case that an ambiguity must appear on the face of a statute before you can apply the rules of interpretation relating to ambiguities. In one sense that is correct, and in another sense it is not. You will frequently find an Act of Parliament perfectly clear on the face of it, and it is only when you apply it to the subject matter that the ambiguity appears. That ambiguity arises frequently from the use of general words. And wherever general words are used in a statute there is always a liability to find a difficulty in applying general words to the particular case. It is often doubtful whether the legislature used the words in the general unrestricted sense, or in a restricted sense with reference to some particular subject matter.'[ Bowtell v Goldsborough Mort 6 Co Limited (1906) 3 CLR 444 at 456-457.]

"A rule of law enacted by statute consists of a proposition which gives rise to legal consequences when the act or omission of some person falls within the factual outline delineated by that proposition.. . The difficulty is to determine whether Parliament intended a particular set of facts to fall within the factual outline of the proposition. That is, the difficulty is to determine the ambit of the factual outline which Parliament intended to enact."[ Kingston v Keprose Pty Limited (1987) 11 NSWLR404 at 421.]

In such cases where natural and ordinary meaning is not possible to derive the following rule may be applied that encapsulates the philosophy of keeping the object and purpose of the statute.[blogger]

"In many cases, the grammatical or literal meaning of a statutory provision will give effect to the purpose of the legislation. Consequently, it will constitute the 'ordinary meaning' to be applied. If however, the literal or grammatical meaning of a provision does not give effect to that purpose, that meaning cannot be regarded as the 'ordinary meaning' and cannot prevail.It must give way to the construction which will promote the underlying purpose or object of an Act” [Saraswati v. The Queen (1990-1919) 172 CLR 1 at 21]