The basic rule for deriving the intent is summarized in the following paragraph.
‘The intention" of Parliament "must be found in the language finally adopted in the Statutes under construction, and in that language alone. No doubt general words may in certain cases properly be interpreted as having a meaning or scope other than the literal or usual meaning. They may be so interpreted where the scheme appearing from the language of the Legislature, read in its entirety, points to consistency as requiring the modification of what would be the meaning apart from any context, or apart from the purpose of the legislation as appearing from the words which the Legislature has used, or apart from the general law.[5]"
However,it has been well established that the judiciary has authority to consult the external aids for interpretation as is indicated by the following citations. No doubt the reference is permissible in the cases where there is ambiguity in the statute and the plain reading of the statute does not afford any help in meaningful interpretation of the provisions of the statute.[Blogger]
To assist in discovering the reason for the change in the terms of the legislation, it is appropriate to examine the debates in the House of Assembly at the time consideration was given to the Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10. Such an exercise was referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morgentaler.[1]
When attempting to discover the legislative intention behind a statute, common practice of professionals has long been a useful and valid extrinsic aid to interpretation., in Bassett v Bassett[2], “The uniform opinion and practice of eminent conveyancers has always had great regard paid to it by all courts of justice”. In Escoigne Properties Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [3],it is stated that:
“In this country we do not refer to the legislative history of an enactment as they do in the United States of America. We do not look at the explanatory memoranda which preface the Bills before Parliament. We do not have recourse to the pages of Hansard. All that the courts can do is take judicial notice of the previous state of the law and of other matters generally known to well informed people.[4]”
Like wise the legislative intent can be drawn from the history and the context of the provisions.’ Viewed in the historical context which I have set out, when cl 2 of the transitional provisions is read as a whole it is in my opinion clear that the legislative objective was to generally reduce sentencing tariffs relating to terms of imprisonment which had been established by the courts by one-third, to offset the abolition of the automatic remission of one-third of each sentence imposed, without stifling the development of sentencing principle and practice by reference to an artificial point in time.[6]’
Apart from the words themselves in a provision and the remaining words of the relevant legislation, what is the material to which we may refer in discovering Parliament’s intent? This question was answered by in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd:[7][524]
“ It is well settled that at common law, apart from any reliance upon s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the court may have regard to reports of law reform bodies to ascertain the mischief which a statute is intended to cure .... Moreover, the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses ‘context’ in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means such as those just mentioned, one may discern the statute was intended to remedy .... Instances of general words in a statute being so constrained by their context are numerous.“
[1] R. v. Morgentaler, 1993 CanLII 74 (S.C.C.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463f
[2] Bassett v Bassett [1744] EngR 1796; (1744) 3 Atk 203 (at 208) per LORD HARDWICK
[3] Escoigne Properties Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] AC 549, per LORD DENNING MR , Of course, the extrinsic aids excluded by Lord Denning MR are available in this State today (Interpretation Act 1987. s.34), but this does not discount the validity of common practice as an aid to interpretation. It has since been said that his Lordship’s reference to “well informed people” might be understood as “learned lawyers” (see Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 2ed, Butterworths, 1987, p191).
[4]Quoted from : Ispt Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] NSWSC 697 (12 August 2003) Supreme Court of New South Wales Decisions
[5] City of London Corporation v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. (1915) A.C., 674, at p. 692. LORD ATKINSON reaffirmed the view of LORD MACNAGHTEN in Vacher & Sons' Case. [1912] UKHL 3; (1913) A.C., 107. Again, LORD HALDANE L.C., in Watney, Combe, Reid & Co. v. Berners(1915) A.C., 885, at p. 891.
[6] YATES -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2008] WASCA 144 (10 July 2008)
[7] CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384; 141 ALR 618per BRENNAN CJ, DAWSON, TOOHEY and GUMMOW JJ
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