Title :Scope of the Statute
The short title clarifies the scope and application of the Act in Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1] it was observed by VISCOUNT HALDANE L.C. that ‘the title
"An Act to provide for the Regulation of Trades Unions and Trade Disputes" …indicate that the scope of the statute was not confined to the regulation of trade disputes merely.[2]
“However, the title of an Act is undoubtedly part of the Act itself, and it is legitimate to use it for the purpose of interpreting the Act as a whole and ascertaining its scope. This is not the case with the short title, which in this instance is "The Trade Disputes Act, 1906." That is a title given to the Act solely for the purpose of facility of reference. ..If I may use the phrase, it is a statutory nickname to obviate the necessity of always referring to the Act under its full and descriptive title. It is not legitimate, in my opinion, to use it for the purpose of ascertaining the scope of the Act. Its object is identification and not description” was observed by LORD MOULTON in the case of Vacher.[supra] where in the Court was establishing the true construction of section 4(1) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.[3]
Ascertainment of the legislative intention with the help of Long Title
Lord SIMON observed while interpreting section 1(1) of Race Relation Act, 1965[4], the significance of the Long Title to debug the legislative intention. He had in this case cited the five avenues for interpreting the legislative intent in absence of suitable papers to support and assist in the interpretation: 1) examination of the social background, as specifically proved if not within common knowledge, in order to identify the social or juristic defect which is the likely subject of remedy; (2) a conspectus of the entire relevant body of the law for the same purpose; (3) particular regard to the long title of the statute to be interpreted (and, where available, the preamble), in which the general legislative objectives will be stated; (4) scrutiny of the actual words to be interpreted in the light of the established canons of interpretation ;
(5) examination of the other provisions of the statute in question (or of other statutes in pari materia) for the light which they throw on the particular words which are the subject of interpretation.
Ascertainment of statutory Objective from Long Title
The long title of the Act indicates, observed the HIGH Court of Australia , is the subject of the Act , and in this case was’ sovereignty in respect of regions beyond Australia's territorial jurisdiction. In this case the Court was construing the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973[5].
The statutory objective is primarily to be collected from the provisions of the statute itself. In these days, when the long title can be amended in both Houses, I can see no reason for having recourse to it only in case of an ambiguity—it is the plainest of all the guides to the general objectives of a statute. But it will not always help as to particular provisions. As to the statutory objective of these, a Report leading to the Act is likely to be the most potent aid; and, in my judgment, it would be mere obscurantism not to avail oneself of it. There is, indeed, clear and high authority that it is available for this purpose[6].In the case while analyzing the provisions of 17 and 23 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976, it was observed that it would be wrong to ignore the object and purpose of the Act as seen in the long title to, and in Part III of, the Act.
Similar observation was made by The long title to the Act of 1976 spells out that its object was
"to establish an agency with the duties of promoting equality of opportunity in employments and occupations in Northern Ireland between the people of different religious beliefs and of working for the elimination of discrimination which is unworkable by virtue of the Act; to render unlawful in connection with such employments and occupations certain kinds of discrimination on the ground of religious belief or political opinion.[7]" here The meaning of section 17 and 23 of Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 was being considered .
The District Court of Queensland in the case of Thomson Hannan[8] that dealt and observed in a dispute in case where it turned on the statutory provisions inserted into the Act by the Civil Justice Reform Act 1998 that
“the long title of that Act indicates that one of its purposes was "to reform the law regulating the relationship between solicitors and clients concerning fees and costs".
[1] Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1912] UKHL 3
[2] This appeal raised the question of the true construction to be put on s. 4 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. That Act was passed five years after the decision of this House in the case of Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A. C. 426. It had been there decided that a trade union, registered under the Trade Union Acts, could be sued in its registered name, and also that a trade union, whether registered or not, could, since the Judicature Acts, be sued in a representative action at common law, if the persons selected as defendants were persons who from their position might fairly be taken to represent the union. It was pointed out by Lord Lindley that if a judgment so obtained was for the payment of damages it could be enforced only against the property of the union, and that to reach such property it might be necessary to make the trustees parties to any proceedings.
[3] “The full title of the Act is, as I have said, "An Act to provide for the Regulation of Trades Unions and Trade Disputes." The appellants ask us to read this as though it were "for the regulation of trades unions as to trade disputes," and to treat the Act as though it related solely to trade disputes so that s. 4, sub-s. 1, must be read with that limitation. I can see nothing to justify such an extraordinary mode of construction of the Act. The title, as it stands, is not only intelligible but admirably describes the purposes of the Act.” Vacher [supra] [per LORD MOULTON] and also” It is evident, therefore, that the title of the Act is amply accounted for, whatever be the view that the Court takes of the matter in dispute, and therefore it cannot assist us in deciding between the two proposed constructions.”
[4] Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board [1971] UKHL 3 (16 December 1971)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1971/3.html
Cite as: [1972] AC 342, [1971] UKHL 3, [1972] 2 WLR 71
[5] TASMANIA v. THE COMMONWEALTH [1975] HCA 58; (1975) 135 CLR 337,
[6] Black Clawson International Ltd v. Papierwerke AG [1975] UKHL 2 (05 March 1975)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1975/2.html
Cite as: [1975] UKHL 2, [1975] AC 591 [per LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE]
[7] Kelly v. Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1998] UKHL 33; [1999] 1 AC 428; [1998] ICR 828; [1998] 3 WLR 735 (29th July, 1998)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1998/33.html
Cite as: [1998] NI 240, [1998] 3 WLR 735, [1998] ICR 828, [1998] UKHL 33, [1998] IRLR 593, [1999] AC 428, [1999] 1 AC 428 [per LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY]
[8] Thomson Hannan v McDonald & Doolan [2002] QDC 258 (9 October 2002)
No comments:
Post a Comment