Section: An Aid to Interpretation-

Interpreting a Provision/

Choices of Interpretation

It is the obligation of the court to seek to identify an interpretation of the section which leads to a certain rather than an uncertain consequence.[1]

Same word Same Meaning Rule

There is a presumption against a change of terminological usage: " It is a sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the " same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament[2]."

“I think that the sub-section is neither self-contradictory nor repugnant to the other provisions of the Act, and that, as regards the words themselves, they are unambiguous, comprehensive, and imperative.Were they ambiguous, other sections or sub-sections might have to be invoked to clear up their meaning; but being unambiguous, such a reference might distort that meaning and so produce error. And of course this is a fortiori the case, if a reference is suggested, not to something within, but to considerations extraneous to, the Act itself. If, for instance, it be argued that the mind of Parliament "looking before and after," having in view the past history of a question and the future consequences of its language, must have meant something different from what it said, then it must be answered that all this essay in psychological dexterity may be interesting, may help to whittle language down or even to vaporize it, but is a most dangerous exercise for any interpreter like a Court of law, whose duty is loyally to accept and plainly to expound the simple words employed. I therefore agree entirely with my noble and learned friend LORD MACNAGHTEN in his view of this case.[3]”

Making a general statement about the interpretation LORD REID observed :

“Construction of the provisions of an Act is for the Court and for no one else. This may seem technical but it is good sense. Occasionally we can find clear evidence of what was intended, more often any such evidence, if there is any, is vague and uncertain. If we are to take into account evidence of Parliament's intention the first thing we must do is to reverse our present practice with regard to consulting Hansard.[4].”

The words of a section heading cannot be used to restrict the terms of the section itself, if they are clear. But where, as here, those terms lend themselves to different meanings, I agree with what Lord Reid said in Director of Public Prosecutions v Schildkamp.[5]

"[I]t may be more realistic to accept the Act as printed as being the product of the whole legislative process, and to give due weight to everything found in the printed Act. I say more realistic because in very many cases the provision before the court was never even mentioned in debate in either House, and it may be that its wording was never closely scrutinised by any member of either House. In such a case it is not very meaningful to say that the words of the Act represent the intention of Parliament but that punctuation, cross-headings and side-notes do not.

... I would not object to taking all these matters into account, provided that we realise that they cannot have equal weight with the words of the Act ... A cross-heading ought to indicate the scope of the sections which follow it but there is always a possibility that the scope of one of these sections may have been widened by amendment." {per Lord SIMON]

Section helps in arriving at the intent of the legislature

“Examination of the other provisions of the statute in question (or of other statutes in pari materia) for the light which they throw on the particular words which are the subject of interpretation.[6]”

Singular to be read as plural

The Interpretation Act, 1937 provides that "every word importing the singular shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as if it also imported the plural"

Construction through Sub-Section

Before looking at the language of the sub-section., it may be useful to consider what this contention involves.[7]

Definition Clause

The function of a definition clause in a statute is merely to indicate that when particular words or expressions the subject of definition, are found in the substantive part of the statute under consideration, they are to be understood in the defined sense—or are to be taken to include certain things which, but for the definition, they would not include. Such clauses are, therefore, no more than an aid to the construction of the statute and do not operate in any other way[8]. Definition sections must be read and accommodated with the rest of the enactment.[9]

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[1] Nangles [supra]

[2] Per LORD SIMON of GLAISDALE in Black v. Clawson citing from Cleasby B. in Courtauld v. Legh (1869) L.R. 4 Ex. 126, 130).

[3] Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1912] UKHL 3 per LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE.

[4] Black Clawson International Ltd v. Papierwerke AG [1975] UKHL 2 (05 March 1975)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1975/2.html
Cite as: [1975] UKHL 2, [1975] AC 591 [per LORD REID}

[5] [1971] AC 1 at 10. See also Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed (1962) at 48-49; Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th ed (2004) at 152-153.

[6] Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board [1971] UKHL 3 (16 December 1971)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1971/3.html
Cite as: [1972] AC 342, [1971] UKHL 3, [1972] 2 WLR 71[per LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE]

[7] Black Clawson International Ltd v. Papierwerke AG [1975] UKHL 2 (05 March 1975)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1975/2.html
Cite as: [1975] UKHL 2, [1975] AC 591[per LORD WILBERFORCE]

[8]Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1966] HCA 74; (1966) 118 CLR 628 at 635

[9] Gidaro v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 154 ALR 550 at 561; Taylor v Public Service Board (1976) 10 ALR 211 at 215

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