weight To parliamentary speeches and History-US

Here are some of the observations made by US courts in regard to the weight that is attached to the Debates and speeches of senators. It has been taken from case whose citation is provided. It may not be the general policy of the courts as there are many rulings where courts have referred to re[ports, senator comments etc.European Community v Rjr Nabisco Inc Rj Rj Rj Rjr Rj [2004] USCA2 14; 355 F.3d 123 (14 January 2004)

1.We cannot find clear evidence of congressional intent to overrule Canada and abrogate the revenue rule as it applies to RICO suits from legislative history that is not related to any actual amendment to RICO. See Shannon v. United States, [1994] USSC 35; 512 U.S. 573, 583[1994] USSC 35; , 114 S.Ct. 2419, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994) (noting that courts do not give "authoritative weight" to elements of the legislative history that are "in no way anchored in the text of the statute").

2. None of these statements represent the "collective understanding" of the committees responsible for the Act, however, and they are therefore not entitled to very much weight. See United States v. Nelson, [2002] USCA2 8; 277 F.3d 164, 186-87 (2d Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 145, 154 L.Ed.2d 54 (2002) ("We ... `eschew[] reliance on the passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor debates.'") (quoting Garcia v. United States, [1985] USSC 30; 469 U.S. 70, 76[1985] USSC 30; , 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984)). 

3. Second, as noted above, the isolated statements of individual legislators do not express the intent of Congress as a whole, and are therefore weak evidence of post-enactment intent. Third, expressions of legislative intent made years after the statute's initial enactment are entitled to limited weight under any circumstances, even when the post-enactment views of Congress as a whole are evident. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170[1968] USSC 144; , 88 S.Ct. 1994, 20 L.Ed.2d 1001(1968) ("[T]he views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by another Congress have very little, if any, significance.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

4. Were we to treat Congress's decision not to enact the proposed rule of construction as an explicit abrogation of the revenue rule, we would be privileging the legislative history of the Patriot Act over its enacted language. To do so would turn on its head the rule that any analysis of a statute and Congress's intent in enacting it must primarily be founded in the text of the statute itself. See Shannon, 512 U.S. at 583[1994] USSC 35; , 114 S.Ct. 2419 ("To give effect to this snippet of legislative history, we would have to abandon altogether the text of the statute as a guide in the interpretative process.").