As a whole

In questions of statutory construction our analysis begins with the language of the statute. As a general rule, when statutory language is plain, there is no cause to examine other indicia of legislative intent. Indiana Port Comm'n v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., [1988] USCA7 72; 835 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir.1987); see also Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., [1986] USCA7 736;801 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir.1986). When section 35 is read in isolation, the plain wording of the statute appears to limit the scope of the provision to violations of a registered trademark. "Yet plain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the beholder." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, [1985] USSC 61; 470 U.S. 729, 737[1985] USSC 61; , 105 S.Ct. 1598,1603, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). Here, we believe that several considerations require that we go beyond the plain wording of this single section of the statute to ensure that the true congressional intent is identified and given effect. First, we must remember that " '[t]he true meaning of a single section of a statute ..., however precise its language, cannot be ascertained if it be considered apart from related sections....' " Commissioner v. Engle, [1984] USSC 4; 464 U.S. 206, 223[1984] USSC 4; , 104 S.Ct. 597, 607[1984] USSC 4; , 78 L.Ed.2d 420 (1984) (quoting Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., [1934] USSC 144; 293 U.S. 121, 126[1934] USSC 144; , 55 S.Ct. 60, 62, 79 L.Ed.2d 232 (1934)); see also Richards v. United States, [1962] USSC 26;369 U.S. 1, 11[1962] USSC 26; , 82 S.Ct. 585, 591-92[1962] USSC 26; , 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962) ("We believe it fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act...."). More recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that "[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., --- U.S. ----[1988] USSC 95; , 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). This court has said that " '[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provision of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " Brach v. Amoco Oil Co., [1982] USCA7 337; 677 F.2d 1213, 1220 (7th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849)). We also have noted that "the Supreme Court has recognized limitations on the requirement that statutory language be interpreted literally. A literal construction is inappropriate if it would lead to absurd results or would thwart the obvious purposes of the statute." Smith v. Bowen, [1987] USCA7 318; 815 F.2d 1152, 1154 (7th Cir.1987) (citing In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, [1978] USSC 104; 436 U.S. 631, 643[1978] USSC 104; , 98 S.Ct. 2053, 2061[1978] USSC 104; , 56 L.Ed.2d 591 (1978)).