No words in Statute is superfluous

The statement of Lord Reid in Pinner v. Everett[1969] 3 AER 257, at 258 commends itself to me as an elegant expression of perhaps the most basic:  “In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase”.   In Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd edition), Butterworths, 1995, the basic rules of statutory interpretation are stated by the learned author. Pride of place is given to the first, as follows: “The judge must give effect to the grammatical and ordinary, or, where appropriate, the technical meaning of words in the general context of the statutes; he must also determine the extent of general words with reference to that context”.

The next important thing is to keep in mind that the Parliament/Congress uses the words with care.There is a standard presumption that Parliament knows the interpretive process hence every word of statute should be assigned meaning. This particular rule of interpretation is derivative of this presuption. [blogger]
All words in a statute must prima facie be given some meaning and effect. In Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority, it was observed:[1]

[A] court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision.[2]

 The Commonwealth v Baume[3] Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet[4] to support the proposition that it was

“a known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent that: ’The  proposition/rule stated above is reinforced by a basic statement that ‘It is also a primary rule of statutory construction that all words used in a statute are presumed to have meaning and effect.[5]’ Statutory provisions must be given some effective work to do.

‘Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision’ has been applied to many cases.[6]

A known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that the acceptable interpretation would be one which does not ignore any clause, sentence, or that word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant in the process.’
‘It is necessary to give meaning to all the words in section viewed their statutory context[7].’ Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision[8] to support the proposition that it was

"a known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent"

In Ajeet Singh Singhvi v. State of Rajasthan (S.C.)9, the Supreme Court speaking about the harmonious construction in interpretation of Statutes held that the Courts should always presume that the legislature inserted every part of the Statute for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. The Apex Court proceeded to say that these presumptions will have to be made in the case of rule making authority also. 


In AIR 1976 Madras 55 (Bright Bros.(P) Ltd., v. J.K.Sayani) rightly pointed out as under, "It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation that no word used by the Legislature in a statute should be ignored or should be held to be meaningless, superfluous or otiose, unless the Court is driven to such a conclusion, having regard to the scheme, object, and other relevant circumstances of the statutory provision."Tamalarasi v. S.Kumarasamy Gounder - A.S.No.404 of 1989 [2003] INTNHC 432 (18 June 2003      
  It is now relevant to refer to a ruling of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 3 SCC 309 (Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India) where the Supreme Court pointed out that the intention of the legislature has primarily to be gathered from the language used and rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. The Supreme Court observed as under, "The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, and as a consequence a construction which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside word(s) in a statute as being inapposite surplusage; if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In the interpretation of statute, the Court always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect.The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. The authorities were, therefore, justified in holding that he was guilty of the offence of absence from duty without proper intimation."Tamalarasi v. S.Kumarasamy Gounder - A.S.No.404 of 1989 [2003] INTNHC 432 (18 June 2003

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[1] Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority, Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [71] [71 reads as: Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision[52]. In The Commonwealth v Baume[53] Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet[54] to support the proposition that it was "a known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent".] per McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY and HAYNE JJ

[2] The Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414 (Griffith CJ) at 419 (O'Connor J); Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 12-13 per MASON CJ

[3] The Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414 per GRIFFITH J

[4] R v Berchet [1794] EngR 1653; (1688) 1 Show KB 106 [89 ER 480]see generally: MAGUIRE v PANKIEWICZ [2009] SASC 169 (12 June 2009)

[5] Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414 per GRIFFITH CJ; Leon Fink Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Film Commission (1979) 141 CLR 672  at 679 per MASON J; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 382.

[6] The Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414, per GRIFFITH CJ; at 419, per O'CONNOR J; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 12 - 13, per MASON CJ

[7] Ackling v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited and Anor [2009] NSWSC 881 (28 August 2009) per  JOHNSON J

[8]  (The Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414, per Griffith CJ; at 419, per O'Connor J; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 12 - 13, per MasonCJ). In The Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414 Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet [1794] EngR 1653; (1688) 1 Show KB 106 [89 ER 480]

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