Meaning is plain effect must be Given irrespective of Consequences

The first thing to be done is to consider what was the object of the legislature in passing this Act. On that point I will refer to the rule laid down in the Sussex Peerage Case, reported in [1844] EngR 822; 11 Cl. & F., 85 

"The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such cases, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But, if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground or cause of making the Statute."{cited from:Perth Local Board of Health v Maley [1904] HCA 28; (1904) 1 CLR 702 (12 October 1904) HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA]As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes impermissible. The supposed intention of the legislature cannot then be appealed to whittle down the statutory 245 language. If the intendment is not in the words used it is nowhere else.[ Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1988] 2 SCC 299, referred to.[KESHAVJI RAVJI & CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [1990] INSC 28; 1990 (1) SCR 243; 1990 (2) SCC 231; 1990 (1) JT 235; 1990 (1) SCALE 207 (5 February 1990)]Section 40 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 opens with the nonobstante clause and directs that outgoings such as interest, salary, bonus, commission or remuneration specifi- cally enumerated in cl. (b) shall not be deducted in comput- ing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". The words used therein on their own terms, are plain and unambiguous. They manifest the intention of the legislature and must, therefore, be applied as they stand.[KeshajiRavji[supra] One of the pillars of statutory interpretation viz., the literalrule, demands that if the meaning of the Statutory Interpretation is plain, the Courts must apply regardless of the result..The very concept of interpretation connotes the introduction of elements which are necessarily extrinsic to the words in the statute. Though the words "Interpretation" and "construction" are used interchangeably, the idea is somewhat different.[COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH-TAX V. SMT. HASHMATUNNISA BEGUM [1989] INSC 14; AIR 1989 SC 1024; 1989 (1) SCR 155; 1989 (2) Suppl.SCC 43; 1989 (1) JT 92; 1989 (1) SCALE 85 (17 January 1989)]in R. Multiform Manufacturing Co. reflex, (1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 390 in support of this position.  There, Lamer C.J. said at p. 394:When the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, no further step is needed to identify the intention of Parliament.  There is no need for further construction when Parliament has clearly expressed its intention in the words it has used in the statute.  As Maxwell stated ...: If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences.[Archean Resources Ltd. v. Newfoundland, 2002 NFCA 43 (CanLII)]
It is too preliminary and trite to state that when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences as held by the Supreme Court in NELSON MOTIS v. UNION OF INDIA [AIR 1992 SC 1981]. Tindal, C.J. in SUSSEX PEERAGE case observed thus: "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver."[cited from:N. Sanjiva Rao v. The Regional Joint Director of School - W.A.No.849 of 2000 [2000] INAPHC 214 (12 September 2000)]
In the following judgement we get many principles of interpretation besides the one that is under discussion.It is for this reason that the entire paragraph is posted.:

"It is too preliminary and trite to state that when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences as held by the Supreme Court in NELSON MOTIS v. UNION OF INDIA[AIR 1992 SC 1981]. Tindal, C.J. in SUSSEX PEERAGE case observed thus: "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver." 

In STATE OF U.P.v.VIJAY ANAND MAHARAJAIR 1963 SC 946 the Supreme Court opined that when a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. If the language of an enactment is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, the results of the construction are not a matter for the Court, even though they may be strange and surprising as held in LONDON BRICK CO. LTD. v. ROBINSON(1943) 1 ALL E.R.23, unreasonable or unjust or oppressive as held in IRC v. HINCHY (1960) 1 ALL E.R. 505. The learned Judge has given a reason in support of the opinion handed down by him. The reason is that:

".....if the employee facing grave charges like misappropriation or fabrication is permitted to continue in office, it would feed aggravation of crime with impunity to further escalate it with a bid to defeat the enquiry or in desperation make hay by falsification of account and defalcation of funds; it would not only inculcate indiscipline among the co-employees but also demoralize the administration causing resentment in the estimation of the general public" The above reasoning cannot be a justification for the Court to virtually amend the statute when the statute is plain, precise, clear and unambiguous and does not admit more than one meaning, and such a course is impermissible having due regard to the principle Casus omissus. According to this principle, a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction as held by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in large number of pronouncements starting with HANSRAJ GUPTA v. DEHRA DUN LMUSSOORIE ELECTRIC TRAMWAY CO. LTD.[ AIR 1933 PC 63]; HIRADEVI v. DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR[ AIR 1952 SC 362]; and the pronouncement in WALIRAM WAMAN HIRAY (Dr.) v. MR. JUSTICE B.LENTIN [AIR 1988 SC 2267]. Secondly, ignorance of the situation highlighted by the learned single Judge cannot be attributed to the Legislature which has enacted sub-Section (3) of Section 79. It is not for the Court to question the wisdom of the Legislature. Interpretation of sub- Section (3) of Section 79 does not involve interstitial filling-in-function of the court." The apex Court had made the observation as above and had the chance to side by side provide some rules of interpretation as well:"The Apex Court in Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. Vs. 16. State of M.P. & ors., 2007 ILR (MP Series) 170 considering the earlier judgments passed by the Apex Court has observed that the plain or unambiguous and clear meaning of the Statute which gives only one meaning has to be given effect to irrespective of its consequences. The Apex Court in paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 29 observed as under:- "26. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. (See: State of Jharkhand V. Govind Singh, Nathi Devi V. Radha Devi Gupta).27. In Sussex Peerage case Tindal C.J. observed as follows: "if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary  sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.28. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.29. As observed in Nathi Devi's case (supra) if the words used are capable of one construction, only then, it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act." [COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL (M.P.) v. FRONTLINE SOFTWARE & SERVICES PVT. LTD. - MAIT--133/2006 [2007] INMPHC 247 (26 March 2007The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences.Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.[NATHI DEVI V. RADHA DEVI GUPTA [2004] INSC 770 (17 December 2004]