Pierre-André Côté, a professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal in his book The Interpretation of Laws, 3th edition., writes on page 364:
"Elmar A. Driedger, in particular, has rejected the rule of the plain meaning of texts advocating, in all cases, an interpretative approach that goes beyond the text. He contrasted the three "rules" classics (Literal Rule, Golden Rule and Mischief Rule) what 'he called the "modern principle" of interpretation:
"Today, Next Today, there is only one principle or approach, we must read the terms of a law in their entire context, the grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the spirit of the law, The purpose of the Act and legislative intent. "This passage, often quoted with approval by members of the country's highest court, rejected the idea clear that the interpretation may consider only the terms of the law ... "
[16] And the author Pierre-André Côté writes on page 369:
"... We must always consider the context, purpose and circumstances to determine the contextual meaning of a phrase (as opposed to mean" virtual "to mean" dictionary "or under" ordinary grammatical).
[17] And the professor side continues on page 377:
"The emphasis placed by the courts on the apparent intention (that is to say that the manifest, a typical reader, the text read in its global context) is justified, especially since this seems to be a condition sine qua non of an effective order organized by general standards predetermined. We must not oppose the intent litigant, some authentic it is, he had no way to deduce the text regarded in its context of utterance. A court may in its task of interpretation, add to the statute terms that are not implied. It should not, even in the name of the true intent (in so far as we can find out the text), wrong expectations that a defendant could have formed because of the way the text is written and the context of its utterance. "
[18] And the professor side continues on page 378:
"If I have seemed far supports the idea that one should look for in the text is that I think entirely appropriate to emphasize the apparent intent of the legislature. By cons, it must criticize this directive if it is used to separate form from its context and, in particular, to exclude consideration of the objectives of the Act as part of the context might shed light on the meaning of the phrase ... "
[19] And he concludes, at page 379:
"Words simply reflect the intent: it must not become an end in itself. If, despite the factual errors, blunders or editorial weaknesses inherent in this tool is language, the intention is clear clearly, the judge should give effect. "
[20] The Supreme Court decision in The Queen v. Hassel Wander, [1993] 2 SCR, Judge Cory wrote at page 413:
"The rule of strict construction becomes applicable only when attempts at neutral interpretation proposed in the art. 12 of the Interpretation Act remain after a reasonable doubt as to the meaning or scope of the text of the law. As noted by Professor Côté, this means that even in the case of criminal laws, must be sought true legislative intent and apply the meaning that corresponds to its objects. "
Cited from: Quebec (Attorney General of the province) c. Franquelin (Municipality), 2001 CanLII 11435 (QC CS)
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