Deviation from Literal Rule: Canada

The following paragraph is taken from a case whose citation is provided at the end of the post. It clearly reflects that courts are now shifting the approach of interpretation. [blogger]

"[15] Pierre-André Côté, a professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal in his book The Interpretation of Laws, 3th edition., writes on page 364:

Elmar A. Driedger, in particular, has rejected the rule of the plain meaning of texts advocating, in all cases, an interpretative approach that goes beyond the text. He contrasted the three "rules" classics (Literal Rule, Golden Rule and Mischief Rule) what 'he called the "modern principle" of interpretation: 

"Today, Next Today, there is only one principle or approach, we must read the terms of a law in their entire context, the grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the spirit of the law, The purpose of the Act and legislative intent. " 

 This passage, often quoted with approval by members of the country's highest court, rejected the idea clear that the interpretation may consider only the terms of the law ... "

  

Qubecec (Attorney General of the province) c. Franquelin (Municipality), 2001 CanLII 11435 (QC CS) Yet in another case, Citing Maxwell, it was observed that:[Blogger] The opening paragraph of c. 11 reads at p. 228:  “EXCEPTIONAL CONSTRUCTION “1. MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE TO MEET THE INTENTION “Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: ‘the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution.’

“What is, then, being discussed here are instances in which the courts will depart from the literal rule. Such instances are, however, exceptional, and it is impossible to lay down any categories of cases in which ordinary grammatical interpretation will inevitably be abandoned: the courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a statute or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a repugnancy or something which is opposed to good sense.”

Rokanas v. Co-operative Fire and Casualty Company, 1976 CanLII 244 (BC S.C.)