Presumption that Statue is in Harmony with Existing Statutes

It is a basic presumption that the legislature knows the existing state of laws and is well aware of the previous enactments. Hence a presumption that the statute should be clearly worded so as to make it harmonious with the provisions of the existing statutes. As per commentators the context of the current statute inder consideration is the entire statute book.While it is common sense arrangement of thepresumptions , it speaks of the present presumption that all the enactments are in sync. with all the statutes. In the ollowing case as well the First Circuit Court of US also observed the same. I am not deleting other quotes of the Court as it also amplifies other statutory principles.[Blogger][
Presumption of coming into Force[Discussed separately]

Because ADAA [Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA)]section 1002 contained no specified effective date, the amendments embodied therein have, in general, been held effective from and after the date of enactment (October 27, 1986). See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, [1989] USCA8 194;869 F.2d 372, 381-82 (8th Cir.) (increased penalties applicable to offense committed in March 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3223, 106 L.Ed.2d 572 (1989); United States v. Posner, [1989] USCA5 197; 865 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir.1989) ("no parole" provision of ADAA applies to February 1987 offense); see also United States v. Levario, [1989] USCA10 181;877 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Meyers, [1988] USCA9 517; 847 F.2d 1408, 1414-16 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Smith, [1988] USCA11 444; 840 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---It is general rule of construction that the Statute is in harmony with the existing Statu-, 109 S.Ct. 154, 102 L.Ed.2d 125 (1988). This is in accord with the presumption that statutes become effective at the moment they are signed into law. See, e.g., United States v. Robles-Pantoja, [1989] USCA5 1785; 887 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir.1989); Levario, 877 F.2d at 1487; Meyers, 847 F.2d at 1415. But, that rule of thumb is merely an aid to ascertaining legislative intent. Ultimately, "absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction." Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, [1983] USCA8 704; 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir.1983). The "effective forthwith" principle does not displace general statutory construction rules, which remain applicable to questions surrounding the time when a statute is to go into effect. See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, [1986] USCA9 849;789 F.2d 682, 686 (9th Cir.1986) (where no date is prescribed for implementation of statute, issue must be resolved under usual tenets of statutory construction); see also United States v. Affleck, [1985] USCA10 109; 765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th Cir.1985) (in absence of congressional intent to the contrary, law takes effect on date of enactment). One such tenet, of course, is that statutes must always be interpreted with a view toward avoiding absurd results and resolving internal inconsistencies. See United States v. Turkette, [1981] USSC 152; 452 U.S. 576, 580[1981] USSC 152; , 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527[1981] USSC 152; , 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Hernandez-Colon v. Secretary of Labor, [1988] USCA1 5; 835 F.2d 958, 960 (1st Cir.1988); see also Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, [1979] USCA1 10; 591 F.2d 121, 128 (1st Cir.1979) (when plain meaning of statute produces a result at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole and an aid to the construction of the meaning is available, there is no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination).