Presumption of Sovereign Immunity
There is a strong presumption of sovereign immunity in US. The presumption is like non applicability of statues against the Crown or that no statute shall apply to crown unless it is expresely stated so. There are line of authorities that are stated in this paragraph. There are many links provided on the page.One can very usefully refer to the link and read the rulings.[Blogger]
"The United States is entitled to immunity from suit without its consent". Muirhead v. Mecham, [2005] USCA1 333; 427 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.2005)
In the case Of Muirhead [supra] the Court stated some principles on the concept of Sovereignity and to whom the umbrella of protection would be available .It observed thus :
“It is beyond cavil that, as the sovereign, the United States is immune from suit without its consent.“ and it was also observed that :
“ Because the mandamus statute applies only to officers and employees of the United States, rather than to the United States itself, the statute does not create any new cause of action against the government. It simply gives the courts jurisdiction in those instances in which substantive law already provides a remedy. Accordingly, the provisions of the mandamus statute do not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.[ Coggeshall Dev. Corp. v. Diamond, [1989] USCA1 416; 884 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1989); Doe v. Civiletti, [1980] USCA2 856; 635 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir.1980).]
It was also stated in the Case of Muirhead [supra] that:
“These holdings do not end our odyssey. Although the government enjoys broad protection through the operation of the sovereign immunity doctrine, that doctrine does not necessarily shield federal officers to the same extent. See, e.g., Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Bd. Emerg. Fleet Corp., [1922] USSC 91; 258 U.S. 549, 567[1922] USSC 91; , 42 S.Ct. 386, 66 L.Ed. 762 (1922) (finding that, although government officers may act as instrumentalities of the government, a government agent, "because he is an agent, does not cease to be answerable for his acts"); Coggeshall Dev., 884 F.2d at 3 (noting that certain suits against individual government officers "will not be considered against the United States, and thus will not be barred by sovereign immunity"). Where, as here, a plaintiff brings suit against a federal employee rather than against the government itself, an inquiring court must analyze the claim to ascertain whether, despite the nomenclature, the suit is, in reality, a suit against the United States. See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, [1945] USSC 163; 326 U.S. 371, 375[1945] USSC 163; , 66 S.Ct. 219, 90 L.Ed. 140 (1945).”
The court in this case also made an observation in regard to a test in this regard as what is not Sovereign in the meaning of the test. It observed thus.
“This is a unitary test, but both the conduct challenged and the relief sought may have a bearing on its outcome. As for conduct, "if the [challenged] actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign" and come under the protective umbrella of sovereign immunity. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695[1949] USSC 108; , 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). As for relief, a suit, although nominally aimed at an official, will be considered one against the sovereign "if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act." Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620[1963] USSC 64; , 83 S.Ct. 999, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963) (citations omitted). When a plaintiff seeks specific performance, the answer to the inquiry about relief hinges on whether the redress obtained against the officer will, in practical effect, be obtained through the sovereign. Larson,337 U.S. at 688, 69 S.Ct. 1457.”
“The Larson Court described two situations in which the acts of a government official would not enjoy the prophylaxis of sovereign immunity. Id. at 689-90, 69 S.Ct. 1457. Both situations envision a plaintiff who, like the appellant, seeks to have a government official conform his conduct to federal law. See id.; see also Kozera v. Spirito, [1983] USCA1 395; 723 F.2d 1003, 1008 (1st Cir.1983) (discussing the Larson exceptions)”
First, "where an officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions." Larson, 337 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. 1457. The Larson Court reasoned that when the officer is not carrying out the sovereign's will, it does not insult the sovereign's authority if a court metes out equitable relief. Id. Second, an officer's acts are not protected if the statute that confers the power to act is unconstitutional or if the officer exercises that power in an unconstitutional manner. See id. at 690, 69 S.Ct. 1457; see also Dugan, 372 U.S. at 621-22, 83 S.Ct. 999. Again, the justification for granting relief is the notion that the officer is not cloaked with legitimate sovereign power when he acts — "the power has been conferred in form but the grant is lacking in substance because of its constitutional invalidity."Larson, 337 U.S. at 690, 69 S.Ct. 1457. Relief in the nature of specific performance is appropriate so long as a government official is sued and either of the two Larson exceptions is implicated. Am. Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol Prods., Inc.,[1993] USCA1 206; 989 F.2d 1256, 1265 (1st Cir.1993).’
“This argument misapprehends the reach of the first Larson exception. While that exception demands that government officials adhere to Congress's general game plan as they carry out their duties, it does not demand that they play a perfect game. Once Congress decides to delegate certain powers and duties to an official and does not expressly limit that authority, the official is afforded a margin of error in carrying out that general mandate. As Larson itself teaches, a mere claim that an official has erred in the exercise of a delegated power is not enough to bring the action out from behind the protective shield of sovereign immunity. Id. at 695, 69 S.Ct. 1457. Put another way, an official's actions within the sphere of his or her delegated authority are not stripped of immunity even if those actions are based on an incorrect reading of the law or a mistaken assessment of the facts. Id. What counts is that "the officer making the decision was empowered to do so." Id.; see also Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, [1963] USCADC 252; 318 F.2d 181, 183 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1963) (refusing to hear a claim against the Attorney General on sovereign immunity grounds because "[a]t most, appellees' claim is that appellant has erred, or will err, in construing the law" as he exercised valid delegated power), aff'd on other grounds, [1964] USSC 61; 376 U.S. 605, 84 S.Ct. 919, 11 L.Ed.2d 940 (1964). When an officer acts erroneously, yet still within the scope of his statutory power, the error is rightly attributed to the sovereign, not the individual, and sovereign immunity bars judicial scrutiny unless there has been an explicit waiver of that immunity. Doehla Greeting Cards v. Summerfield, [1955] USCADC 513; 227 F.2d 44, 47 (D.C.Cir.1955)”
Cited from: Muirhead v L Mecham [2005] USCA1 333; 427 F.3d 14 (20 October 2005)
Reference cases for Sovereign Immunity:
[See 1.United States v. Thompson, [1878] USSC 191; 98 U.S. 486, 489[1878] USSC 191; , 25 L.Ed. 194 (1878); Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 55. That consent usually takes the form of an express waiver of its sovereign immunity. Such a waiver "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."
2.United States v. King, [1969] USSC 116; 395 U.S. 1, 4[1969] USSC 116; , 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). Even then, the waiver must be strictly construed. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, [1983] USSC 80; 461 U.S. 273, 287[1983] USSC 80; , 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983); see also United States v. Horn, [1994] USCA1 357; 29 F.3d 754, 762 (1st Cir.1994). In the absence of an applicable waiver, courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims against the United States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058(1941).
[ see also
1.United States v. Horn, [1994] USCA1 357; 29 F.3d 754, 761-62 (1st Cir.1994) (discussing the historical background of sovereign immunity). Although the USPS is independent from the executive branch, the Supreme Court has held that the Postal Service enjoys the federal government's immunity from suit because of its significant government powers.
2.Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 1255-56, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). Potter, in his official capacity as Postmaster General, enjoys similar immunity.
3.See Loeffler v. Frank, [1988] USSC 109; 486 U.S. 549, 562 n. 8[1988] USSC 109; , 108 S.Ct. 1965, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988) ("Whenever the head of the Postal Service acts in his official capacity, he is acting in the name of the Postal Service. Thus, here . . . the acts of the named defendant are always chargeable as acts of the person or entity subject to the [waiver of immunity]."). Therefore, in order for Gómez to bring suit against the USPS and Potter, we need to find an "unequivocal" waiver of immunity that is expressed in "specific" statutory language.
4.United States v. Mitchell, [1980] USSC 100; 445 U.S. 535, 538[1980] USSC 100; , 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980); United States v. King, [1969] USSC 116; 395 U.S. 1, 4[1969] USSC 116; , 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). The Postal Reorganization Act, however, generally "waives the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by giving it the power `to sue and be sued' in its official name." U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. Ltd., [2004] USSC 18; 540 U.S. 736, 744 [2004] USSC 18; , 124 S.Ct. 1321, 158 L.Ed.2d 19 (2004) (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 401(1)). Accordingly, sovereign immunity does not present a bar to bringing an ADEA suit against the USPS or Potter.]
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