How to Interpret the Constitution and constitutional changes
The onstitution being the fundamental law, no law passed under mere legislative power can effect any change in the Constitution unless there is an express power to that effect given in he Constitution itself. There are a number of articles which expressly provide for amendment of theConstitution by law. But where no power is conferred on the Parliament to make laws, it cannot add to the Constitution by ordinary law making process[1]. The provisions of constitutional changes have to be construed not in a narrow isolationism but on a much wider spectrum and the principles laid down in Heydon's case are instructive[2].. In construing the expressions of the Constitution to judge whether the provisions of a statute are within the competence of the State Legislature, one must bear in mind that the Constitution is to be construed not in a narrow or pedantic sense. The Constitution is not to be construed as mere law but as the machinery by which laws are to be made[3].
It is well settled that the fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution are to be read as a part of an integrated scheme. They are not exclusive of each other but operate, and are, subject to each other. The action complained of must satisfy the tests of all the said rights so far as they are applicable to individual cases. In particular, Article 22(5) is not the sole repository of the detenu's rights. His rights are also governed by the other fundamental rights, particularly those enshrined in Articles 14, 19, and 21. Hence, while examining action resulting in the deprivation of the liberty of any person, the limitations on such action imposed by the other fundamental rights, where and to the extent applicable have to be borne in mind[4]. Repeatedly, this Court has declared that a broad and liberal construction in keeping with the purposes of aConstitution must be given preference over adherence to too literal an interpretation[5], of the Constitution. In particular, the plenitude of power to legislate, indicated by a legislative entry, has to be given as wide and liberal an interpretation as is reasonably possible. Thus, in "....it is an elementary cardinal rule of interpretation that the words used in the Constitution which confer legislative power must receive the most liberal construction and if they are words of wide amplitude, they must be interpreted so as to give effect to that amplitude. It would be out of place to put a narrow or restricted construction on words of wide amplitude in a Constitution. A general word used in an entry like the present one must be construed to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be held to be included in it[6]".
[1] I.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. [1967] 2S.C.R. 762 referred to.
[2] Black Clawson International Ltd. v. PapierwerkeWaldhof-Aschaffenburg, [1975] 1 All E.R. 810, referred.Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, relied on.
[3]James v. Commonwealth of Australia, [1936] A.C. 578; TheAttorney General for the State of New South Wales v. TheBrewery Employees Union etc., [1908] 6 C.L.R. 469; Re.Central Provinces & Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act 1938, A.I.R. 1939 F.C.I. and The Province
of Madras v. M/s Boddu Paidanna & Sons, A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 33,referred to.
[4] See; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR530 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR621,
[5]. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,(supra)
[6] Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P.,
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