To read what Legislature had not intended
The duty of the court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used; those words may be ambiguous, but. even if they are, the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited." The Industrial Disputes-Malhotra, Vol. 1 pp. 44 & 45)
It is not that the reading down is used for a purpose which is just the opposite which the legislature had intended. Legislature had not intended arbitrary or uncontrolled-or whimsical power. Indeed it considered.. It is also not reading to the legislature conditions which were not there in the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution[1]. It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite,recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The Court cannotadd words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities[2].
Doctrine of reading Down in service termination
In the circumstances power must be there, the power must be read down in the manner and to the extent indicated above, of terminating the services of permanent employees without holding any enquiry in the stated contingencies and this would be either by virtue of the silence of the provision indicating the contingencies of termination or by virtue of constitutional inhibitions. That reading would not violate the theory that judges should not make laws[3].
[1] Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] Supp. 2SCR 131, relied on.
[2]Vide P.K. Unni v.Nirmala Industries, 1990 1 SCR 482 at 488;Mangilal v.Suganchand Rathi, [1965] 5 SCR 239; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhiv. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 489; Smt.HiraDevi & Ors. v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, [1952] SCR 1122at 113 1; Nalinkhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar [1953] SCR 533 at 545; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdaor Sabha, [1980] 2 SCR 146; S. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam [1973] 1 SCR 172 at 182;N.S.Vardachari vG. Vasantha Pai [1973]1 SCR886;Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth & [1978]1 SCR423 and Comm. of Sales Tax, U.P.v. AuriayaChamber of Commerce, Allahabad, [1986] 2 SCR 430 at438.
[3] Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, [1959] SCR 279 at 299; Jyoti Prasad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125 at 139; Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha & Anr., [1970] 2 SCC 450 at 461; N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 3 SCC 611 paragraphs 9 and 10 at page 619; Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore & Ors. v. Radhakrishan & Ors., [1979] 2 SCC 249 at 257; Olga Tellis & Ors. etc. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., [1985] Suppl.2 SCR 51 at 89; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 930 at p. 935 and 938; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 769; R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 6 SCR 784; Jagdish Pandev v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar & Anr., [1968] 1 SCR 231, at pages 236-237; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.Ltd.
v. State of Assam & Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 709; Charan Lal Sahu & Ors. v. Union of India, [1989] Suppl. SCALE 1, at pages 53 and 54, paras 101 as well as p. 61 para 114; Shah & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, [1967] 3 SCR 466 at 477-78; M. Pentiah and Ors. v. Veera-Mallappa and Ors., [1961] 2 SCR
295; Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board etc. v. A. Rajappa & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 207; Minerva Mills Ltd.& Ors., v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206, at p. 239 and 259; Elliott Ashton Welsh, 11 v. United States, 26 Lawyers' Edition 2nd, 308 at 327; Malinakhva Bysack v. Shyam Sunder
Haldar & Ors., [1953] SCR 533, at p. 544-545 and Municipal Committee, Amritsar & Anr. v. State of Punjab & ors., [1969] 3 SCR 447, referred to. United States of America v. Edward A. Rumely, 97 Law-yers Edition 770 at 775; Reg. v. Sadiers Co., 10 H.L.C. 404,460 and 463; Framamus v. Film Artists Association, 1962 QB527 at 542 and Seaford Court Estates, [1949] 2 KB 481 H.M. Seervaid 'Constitutional Law of India', 3rd Edn.Vol. 1 pages 119-120 and Lord Denning: "The discipline ofLaw", at p. 12
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