The modern rule. There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just.
The contextual approach requires that the Court consider a broad range of factors such as the text of the provision to be interpreted, the legislative scheme within which the provision appears and other indicia of legislative intent. If the various factors point to differing conclusions, then the Court must weigh the competing factors and test possible interpretations against the broad criteria laid out in the passage quoted above. In the end, it is the duty of the Court to decide and to provide reasons for its arrival at that decision.
In any event, where the various indicia point to possible differing conclusions, the contextual approach requires consideration of the consequences of the competing interpretations. The proper interpretation will be the one that provides outcomes that are reasonable and just.
Driedger[1] formulates the modern interpretation of the rules of construction as follows:
“(1) The Act as a whole is to be read in its entire context so as to ascertain the intention of Parliament (the law as expressly or impliedly enacted by the words), the object of the Act (the ends to be achieved), and the scheme of the Act (the relation between the individual provisions of the Act).
(2) The words of the individual provisions to be applied to the particular case under consideration are then read in their grammatical and ordinary sense in the light of the intention of Parliament embodied in the Act, and if they are clear and unambiguous and in harmony with that intention, object and scheme and with the general body of the law, that is the end.
(3) If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then a meaning that best accords with the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, but one that the words are reasonably capable of bearing, is to be given them.”
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