Chapter-12 Contextual Approch Part-1

Contextual Approach

The contextual approach to statutory interpretation requires the Court to consider a broad range of factors such as the text of the provision to be interpreted, the legislative scheme within which the provision appears and other indicia of legislative intent. If the various factors point to differing conclusions, then the Court must weigh the competing factors and test possible interpretations against plausibility, efficacy and acceptability[1]. It is time to abandon the method based on the "plain meaning" of words as the basic approach to legal interpretation. According to the modern approach, consideration must be given at the outset not only to the words themselves but also, inter alia, to the context, the statute's other provisions, provisions of other statutes in pari materia and the legislative history in order to correctly identify the legislature's objective. It is only after reading the provisions with all these elements in mind that a definition will be decided on. This "modern" interpretation method has the advantage of bringing out the underlying premises and thus preventing them from going unnoticed, as they would with the "plain meaning" method. In light of the dynamic development of our law and the plurality of perspectives on legal analysis, the era of concealed underlying premises is now over. However, the "plain meaning" method, with its methodological estoppel that prevents the initiation of legal reasoning, is justified in a technical field such as tax law because of the imperatives of stability and predictability of the law; moreover, the use of the "plain meaning" in that area does not have any undesirable side effects[2].

Lord Radcliffe, in dealing with a reference for advice as to a question as to the meaning of certain words which were contained in the House of Commons (Clergy Disqualification) Act, 1801, said: '[T]he meaning which these words ought to be understood to bear is not to be ascertained by any process akin to speculation. The primary duty of a court of law is to find the natural meaning of the words used in the context in which they occur, that context including any other phrases in the Act which may throw light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used the words in dispute[3].'

It is reasonable to believe that this rationality first manifests itself within a particular enactment: the statute to be read as a whole, and each of its components should fit logically into its scheme. This coherence should extend to other legislation, particularly in the same subject area. Accompanying this "horizontal" consistency is a "vertical" consistency. Enactments are deemed to fit into a hierarchy of legal norms: regulations are presumed consistent with statutory requirements, and statutes, with the Constitution. [Côté, at page 257.]The courts may be justified in setting aside a meaning that seems clear and precise at first glance, if in so doing the internal consistency of the statute is re-established.

Noscitur A Sociis

This is a well-known rule of interpretation: a term or expression cannot be interpreted without taking surrounding terms into account. The meaning of a term is revealed by its association with other terms: it is known by its associates (noscitur a sociis).

Just as the literal method posits that the legislator can accurately communicate via the written word, the contextual method is based on the assumption that the legislator is rational. The product of this rational legislator, the law, is deemed to be a reflection of coherent and logical thought. Interpretations consistent with this supposed legislative rationality are therefore favoured over those that are incoherent, inconsistent, illogical or paradoxical.

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[1] McCaguev. Canada (Minister of National Defence) (C.A.) [2001] 4 F.C. 387 Per Sexton J.A. (Isaac J.A. concurring)

[2] Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d'alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919

[3] In re MacManaway [1951] A.C. 161 at p. 169,