3.06.2010

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The most comprehensive coverage on the construction of Statutes. It includes parts of statutes,Extrinsic-Aids,Intrinsic aids, Reading down, Amendments,Repeals,codifications,Quasi-Judicial agencies,Non-obstante clause,Mandatory/Declatory provisions,Tax ,Beneficial, Criminal,Fiscal Statute's Interpretation and sub-ordinate legislations.Besides it contains the Rules of Interpretation and the Role of Judiciary.Citations are in abundance.



Showing posts with label purpose of Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label purpose of Act. Show all posts

Friday, May 28, 2010

Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction

What is Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is the process of interpreting and applying legislation. Some amount of interpretation is always necessary when case involves a statute. Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and straightforward meaning. But in most cases, there is some ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that must be resolved by the judge. To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation to legislation enacted by the legislature or to delegated legislation such as administrative agency regulations.

Meaning

The judiciary interprets how legislation should apply in a particular case as no legislation unambiguously and specifically addresses all matters. Legislation may contain uncertainties for a variety of reasons:
Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in meaning over time.
Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make application of existing laws difficult.
Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for compromise or catering to special interest groups.
Therefore, the court must try to determine how a statute should be enforced. This requires statutory construction. It is a tenet of statutory construction that the legislature is supreme (assuming constitutionality) when creating law and that the court is merely an interpreter of the law. In practice, by performing the construction the court can make sweeping changes in the operation of the law.

Conflicts between sources of law

Where legislation and case law are in conflict, there is a presumption that legislation takes precedence insofar as there is any inconsistency. In the United Kingdom this principle is known as Parliamentary Sovereignty. In Australia and in the United States, the courts have consistently stated that the text of the statute is used first, and it is read as it is written, using the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute.
"[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149(1992). Indeed,
"when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'"
"A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary." Raven Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 149 S.E. 541 (1929).
"In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage." Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1996);
Federal jurisdictions may presume that either federal or local government authority prevails in the absence of a defined rule. In Canada, there are areas of law where provincial governments and the federal government have concurrent jurisdiction. In these cases the federal law is held to be paramount. However, in areas where the Canadian constitution is silent, the federal government does not necessarily have superior jurisdiction. Rather, an area of law that is not expressly mentioned in Canada's Constitution will have to be interpreted to fall under either the federal residual jurisdiction found in s. 91 -- known as the Peace, Order and Good Government clause -- or the provinces residual jurisdiction of "Property and Civil Rights" under s. 92(10) of the 1867 Constitution Act. This contrasts with other federal jurisdictions, notably the United States and Australia, where it is presumed that if legislation is not enacted pursuant to a specific provision of the federal Constitution, the states will have authority over the relevant matter in their respective jurisdictions.

Internal and external consistency

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the act. The ejusdem generis (Latin for "of the same kind") rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear. The rule results that where "general words follow enumerations of particular classes or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as those enumerated." 49 F. Supp. 846, 859. Thus, in a statute forbidding the concealment on one's person of "pistols, revolvers, derringers, or other dangerous weapons," the term "dangerous weapons" may be construed to comprehend only dangerous weapons of the kind enumerated, i.e., firearms, or perhaps more narrowly still, handguns. Here, the term "dangerous weapons" must be given a meaning of the "same kind" as the word of established meaning.
A statute shall not be interpreted so as to be inconsistent with other statutes. Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious interpretation.

Statements of the legislature

Legislative bodies themselves may try to influence or assist the courts in interpreting their laws by placing into the legislation itself statements to that effect. These provisions have many different names, but are typically noted as:
Findings;
Declarations, sometimes suffixed with of Policy or of Intent; or
Sense of Congress, or of either house in multi-chamber bodies.
These provisions of the bill simply give the legislature's goals and desired effects of the law, and are considered nonsubstantive and non-enforcable in and of themselves.
Go back to Rules of Interpretation

Sunday, April 18, 2010

Preamble :An Aid to Interpretation

Preamble: Aid to Interpretation

“Nowadays, when it is a rare thing to find a preamble in any public general Statute, the field of inquiry is even narrower than it was in former times. In the absence of a preamble there can, I think, be only two cases in which it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be shown either that the words taken in their natural sense lead to some absurdity or that there is some other clause in the body of the Act inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the enactment in question construed in the ordinary sense of the language in which it is expressed.[1]"

As the preamble to the Law of Property Act,1952 shows that it was an Act "to consolidate " the enactments relating to conveyancing and the law of property in England and Wales.In these circumstances the presumption is that such an Act is not intended to alter the law, but this prima facie view must yield to plain words to the contrary.[2] LORD GUEST also observed in this case that any fundamental change in law would be altering the Law as was enunciated in earlier cases.[3] There is a presumption that consolidation acts are not intended to alter the law[4].In Oy, R (on the application of) v. Bristol Magistrates Court & Ors [5] reference was made to the preamble of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Act states that its purpose is, among other things, "to make further provision for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work" and it was observed that: ”The same purpose is reiterated in the heading to Part I of the Act and in s.1(1). Sections 3 to 5 deal with the duties of employers and those responsible for the work-place. S.6, as amended by the Consumer Protection Act 1987, provides:”" It shall be the duty of any person who designs, manufactures, imports or supplies any article for use at work to ensure, so far as is reasonably practical, that the article is so designed and constructed that it will be safe and without risks to health at all times when it is being ... used ...by a person at work; ....

" In the same case it was stated that:” Regarding safety standards, the preamble notes that harmonization must be confined to the requirements necessary to satisfy 'essential health and safety requirements' relating to machinery.[6]”

“Preamble signifies the object and the purpose of the Act/statute and it may or may not be treated as an integral part of the statute. In case of ambiguity the reference can be made to it but whether it will stand the test of legality is yet to be tested. There is no uniformity of approach as to the basic question if the preamble can be treated as announcer of policy.[7]”

To this effect it has been stated :

“without a degree of violence to the express terms of the Act, for which neither its context nor its policy (as expressed in the preamble) affords any justification, to restrict the operation of the 2nd section to "the two descriptions of easement therein specified, viz., the right to a way or watercourse.[8]"



[1]Per Lord Macnaghten and quoted in Lukey v Edmunds [1916] HCA 25; (1916) 21 CLR 336 (11 April 1916 per ISAACs J

[2] See:Gray v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] A.C.1.per VISCOUNT SIMONDs page 13 as cited in Beswick v Beswick [1967] UKHL 2 (29 June 1967)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1967/2.html
Cite as: [1967] 3 WLR 932, [1968] AC 58, [1967] 2 All ER 1197, [1967] UKHL 2

[3]See: Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 1 B. & S. 393 ; 121 E.R. 762, affirmed in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. [1915] A.C. 847 and confirmed in Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd. [1962] A.C. 446

[4] Beswick v Beswick [1967] UKHL 2 (29 June 1967) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1967/2.html
Cite as: [1967] 3 WLR 932, [1968] AC 58, [1967] 2 All ER 1197, [1967] UKHL 2 per LORD UPJOHN[In practice both Houses of Parliament send consolidation bills to the Joint Committee of both Houses on Consolidation Bills who consider and report upon them to both Houses. The Joint Committee call the draftsmen of the Bill before them to give evidence and sometimes they have to resolve doubts whether a clause in the Bill is pure consolidation or not.]

[5] Oy, R (on the application of) v. Bristol Magistrates Court & Ors [2003] UKHL 55 (23 October 2003)

[6] Bristol Magistrates [supra]

[7] Author

[8] Dalton v Henry Angus & Co [1881] UKHL 1 (14 June 1881)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1881/1.html
Cite as: 6 App Cas 740, (1881-72) LR 6 App Cas 740, [1881] UKHL 1 [per THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Selborne
)

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