By making this [ie the requirement of consistency with purpose] plain, the courts would be provided with clear guidance to interpret legislation to give effect to a right so long as that interpretation is not so strained as to disturb the purpose of the legislation in question. This is consistent with some of the more recent cases in the United Kingdom, where a more purposive approach to interpretation was favoured. In the United Kingdom House of Lords decision in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said
‘the meaning imported by application of s 3 must be compatible with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed. Words implied must ... “go with the grain of the legislation”.’
Or as Lord Rodger of Earlsferry stated:
‘It does not allow the Courts to change the substance of a provision completely, to change a provision from one where Parliament says that x is to happen into one saying that x is not to happen.
Cited from:R v Momcilovic [2010] VSCA 50 (17 March 2010),Supreme Court of Victoria - Court of Appeal
3.06.2010
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