Presumption tat Fundamental Rights cannot be taken away by General words

Fundamental Rights cannot be taken away by general words

This is a basic rule of construction that puts limitations on th extent of the scope that can be created by the general words of the statute. General words are meant for general things. In the following case ,it was  observed by LORD REID that the fundamental right like approaching the Court, against the decision taken under vast discretionary powers on some state instrumentality, cannot be denied to any one who has been subjected to unreasonable decision. The right to approach the court is a basic principle and cannot be denied .The following observations of LORD REID speaks of two thing simultaneously i..e the denial of fundamental rights and the abuse of discretion.[Blogger]

"There are many cases where general words in a statute are given a limited meaning. That is done not only when there is something in the statute itself which requires it, but also where to give general words their apparent meaning would lead to conflict with some fundamental principle. Where there is ample scope for the words to operate without any such conflict it may very well be that the draftsman did not have in mind and Parliament did not realise that the words were so wide that in some few cases they could operate to subvert a fundamental principle. In general, of course, the intention of Parliament can only be inferred from the words of the statute, but it appears to me to be well established in certain cases that, without some specific indication of an intention to do so, the mere generality of words used will not be regarded as sufficient to shew an intention to depart from fundamental principles. So general words by themselves do not bind the Crown, they are limited so as not to conflict with international law, they are commonly read so as to avoid retrospective infringement of rights, and it appears to me that they can equally well be read so as not to deprive the Court of jurisdiction where bad faith is involved. If authority be needed for reading general words so as not to deprive the Court of jurisdiction in such a case, I find it in Colder v. Halket.

3 Moore P.C. 28, where general words in 21 Geo. III c. 60 s. 24 were even farther limited without there being anything in the statute to indicate that they should be read in a limited sense.

 I think that there is still room for reason to point out that the general words in this case must be limited so as to accord with the principle, of which Parliament cannot have been ignorant, that a wrongdoer cannot rely on general words to avoid the consequences of his own dishonesty. [per LORD REID] Like wise the following observation was made by other judge;It is quite true, as is said, that these are merely general words : but then, unless there is some compelling reason to the contrary, I should be inclined to regard general words as the most apt to produce a corresponding general result. [ per Lord Radcliffe]Smith (Kathleen Rose) v East Elloe Rural DC [1956] UKHL 2 (26 March 1956) 

URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1956/2.html 
Cite as: [1956] UKHL 2, [1956] AC 736