The presumption that Crown is not bound by the Statute may not have universal implication as the State may legislate to bind the crown as is established by Australian Authorities. Further the presumption would hold good in the cases where there is express provision to this or ,atleast, the same can be clear by the implications.[Blogger]
State may Legislate to Bind the Crown
Other exceptions to the Rule of Presumption
Qualification of Crown as per constitutional Theory
It has been decided by the highest authority that, in constitutional theory, the Crown is one and indivisible (Williams v. Howarth). It is by the Crown that all legislative and administrative authority is exercised throughout the Empire, although in each constitutional area such authority can be exercised by the Crown only through the agencies of the appropriate parliament and the appropriate group of constitutional ministers, so that, legalistically, it would be more strictly accurate to speak of the State of Western Australia in the right of the Crown than of the Crown in the right of the State of Western Australia (Theodore v. Duncan). Thus, the prerogatives of the Crown are the prerogatives of a single, universal Crown, and enure for the benefit of each and every part of the Empire, save to the extent to which in any part any particular prerogative has been abrogated or diminished (In re Bateman's Trust). The principle was applied by this Court inFederal Commissioner of Taxation v. Official Liquidator of E. O. Farley Ltd in relation to competing rights of the Crown as creditor to be preferred above other creditors of equal degree, for the benefit of different treasuries. The constitutional principle that the Crown is one and indivisible is not limited to cases in which it is the scope of the prerogative which is in question. This is clear from Williams v. Howarth. It applies to the Crown in all its capacities; but it is not inconsistent with this that the Crown should, by appropriate parliamentary action, be shorn, in certain of its fields, of rights or immunities which it retains in others. The theory of the unity of the Crown produces, in relation to the rule now in question for the construction of statutes, the twofold result that, first, the Crown in all its capacities is prima facie not bound by a statute made in any part of the Empire unless this is provided for expressly or by necessary implication, and second, a provision that a statute binds the Crown binds it prima facie in all its capacities unless a contrary intention appears. The second of these results is established by such cases as Attorney-General for Quebec v. Nipissing Central Railway Co. and Pirrie v. McFarlane: the first is a corollary of the second. It is true that a different opinion was expressed in R. v. Sutton, as one of the grounds for holding that the Government of New South Wales was bound by a Commonwealth Customs Act; but the ghost of the heresy of Crown schizophrenia propounded in that case was laid in such explicit terms in theEngineers' Case (where R. v. Sutton was cited to lead up to an observation that "the utmost confusion and uncertainty exist as the decisions now stand") that I feel some surprise at the attempt which has been made to resuscitate it.