Shift in Interpretation to Purposive and Value Based Approach

A Shift from Strict Literal Meaning to Natural and Ordinary Meaning in Context

Both Professor Burrows and Justice McGrath refer to the old style of interpretation where courts applied the strict literal meaning of statutes as deduced from the words in question, the dictionary meanings, and rules of grammar.[ Professor John Burrows "The Changing Approach to the Interpretation of Statutes" Roles and Perspectives in the Law, 561 and John J McGrath "Reading Legislation and Ivor Richardson" Roles and Perspectives in the Law, 597. ]

Adoption of Golden Rule when Literal Approach leads to absurdity

The golden rule allowed this approach to be departed from where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd or unjust result. However, the new meaning given to the words still needed to be one that the words could bear.[ River Wear Commissioners v Adamson [1877] 2 AC 743, 764 (HL). As both Professor Burrows and Justice McGrath explained,[River Water Commission supra ] there has been a shift away from this strict literal approach. The shift includes a move toward a purposive approach and an increasing recognition of an approach described by Professor Burrows as "value-based interpretation".[River Water Commission supra]

Shift from Literal Approach to Natural and Ordinary Meaning in context

There has also been a subtler shift in approach, which is worth considering further since it was not the main focus of Professor Burrow's and Justice McGrath's papers. This is the shift from the strict literal approach to an approach that looks for the natural and ordinary meaning of words in their context.

This relaxation of the strict literal approach involves a wider search for meaning than simply looking at the word in question, its dictionary meaning and rules of grammar. The modern courts are concerned with finding the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or provision in its context. This involves consideration of the natural and ordinary meaning of the word in everyday usage as a more important indicator of meaning than the dictionary definition. More important than both the dictionary and ordinary usage is the internal context of the Act. Professor Burrows refers to this as the "scheme of the Act". The word must be examined in the context of the whole Act rather than limiting the inquiry to the section in question. So, for example if the issue is whether the word "wildlife" includes a dead kiwi in section 63 of an Act [Wildlife Act 1953]. it is relevant that under section 55 of the same Act the drafter refers to "the dead bodies of ... wildlife".[See Police v Johnson (1990) 3 NZLR 211 (HC).] If the word "wildlife" included the dead bodies of such wildlife there would be no need to use the expression "dead bodies of wildlife".

The examination of the internal context of the Act is more than a tool to be used when determining the purpose of the Act, it is firstly and more importantly a method for deducing natural meaning. Jefferies J stated in Arataki Honey Ltd v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries "[i]n the complex task of wresting the true construction of an Act it cannot be compartmentalised and scrutinised molecularly".[ Arataki Honey Ltd v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1979] 2 NZLR 311, 314 (SC) Jefferies J]

Although the strict literal rule has been relaxed and the purposive approach has been given more emphasis in recent years, the basic rule that prima facie the natural and ordinary meaning of words in their context must be applied still stands. The statutory language is still the starting point and in many cases it also provides the answer. A study conducted at the University of Otago showed that in almost half of the Court of Appeal cases involving statutory interpretation in 1976, 1986 and 1996, the Court reached its decision relying on simply the statutory language itself and any relevant precedent cases.[ See Jane Allen " Statutory Interpretation and the Courts" (1999) 18 NZULR 439, 479. ] Recognition of the importance of the statutory language itself is now contained in section 5(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1999, which directs the courts to ascertain meaning from the text of an enactment in light of its purpose.