Chapter-4
Irish Law : Parliamentary Debates
Part-4-19
In principle, it appears that Irish law does allow for Oireachtas debates to be considered, at least where a provision is ambiguous or obscure. In Wavin Pipes Ltd v Hepworth Iron Ltd Costello J approved the consideration of parliamentary debates, relying on Bourke v Attorney General . He noted the developments in the English courts whereby the travaux preparatoires of international conventions had been used in statutory interpretation and the parliamentary history of the Employment Act, 1980 had been considered in Hadmoor Productions Ltd v Hamilton .
If it was regarded as proper for the courts to refer to the history of the adoption of an international convention, he held, there could be no principled argument against the examination, in appropriate cases, of the parliamentary history of a statute. He held that the Court could look to the legislative history of the Patents Act, 1964 , in ascertaining the intent of the legislature and construing the meaning of one of the Act's provisions.
In FF v CF, BARR J, in considering the purpose for which the Oireachtas had enacted the Statute Law Revision (Pre-Union Statutes) Act, 1962 , considered the speech of the then Minister for Justice on the second reading of the Bill in the Dáil. The speech of the Minister clarified the point at issue in the case, that the purpose of section 2 of the Act was to preserve existing principles of law which might otherwise be affected by the repeal of statutes in the Act.
In Wadda v Ireland it was argued in the High Court that regard should be had, in construing the provisions of the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act, 1991 , and the Convention which it implemented, to ministerial statements made in the course of Dáil debates on the Bill. Keane J held, however, that the issue did not arise in the case. Since the provisions of the Act to be construed had been taken from the text of the Convention, it was held that statements made in the Dáil could be of no assistance in clarifying the intention of those who had written the provision: the framers of the Convention. Furthermore, Keane J found that there was nothing ambiguous, obscure or absurd in the provision to be interpreted. A similar conclusion was arrived at in the case of CK v CK which also concerned the Child Abduction Convention.
In the case of DPP v McDonagh the Supreme Court endorsed the use of a wide range of extrinsic aids to interpretation, including parliamentary debates. It was held that a court could have regard to any aspect of a provision's legislative history which might be of assistance to the court. In DPP v Brennan , MCCRACKEN J followed McDonagh , and was prepared to consider Dáil debates relating to section 19 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act,1994 . However, he found that the Dáil debates did not in fact assist in the resolution of the case before him.
"I am satisfied that it would not be permissible to interpret a statute upon the basis of either speculation, or indeed, even of actual information obtained with regard to the belief of individuals who either drafted the statute or took part as legislators in its enactment with regard to the question of the appropriate legal principles applicable to matters being dealt with in the statute.[1]"
[1] Statutory Drafting and Interpretation, Consultation Paper on: Plain Language and the Law (LRC CP14-1999) [1999] IELRC 1 (1st July, 1999)
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