3.06.2010

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Showing posts with label abolish or modify fundamental common Law principles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label abolish or modify fundamental common Law principles. Show all posts

Monday, June 7, 2010

Understanding Due Process Clause -American Concept

 The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the American Constitution provide that life, liberty and property cannot be deprived without “due process of law.” This seemingly innocuous phrase, borrowed, oddly, from per legem terre in the Magna Carta, acquired meaning in the American constitutional context, consequent to years of judicial exposition.
Over time, the phrase acquired “substantive” and “procedural” meanings, each of which enhanced the powers of the judiciary. For example, in exercise of powers conferred by the “due process” clause of the Constitution, American courts would create “new” or unenumerated rights. Most notably, these were the rights to abortion, marriage, homosexuality, the use of contraceptives, child-rearing, and so on. The “due process” clause mandated harmonious constitutional interpretation, and enabled American courts to apply federal constitutional standards against the States on principles of “fairness” or “ordered liberty.” Interestingly, in the Magna Carta the phrase “due process of law” was meant to curb the powers of the royal judiciary in favour of the feudal baronage, quite contrary to the spirit of judicial activism that is now attributed to the clause.
Two decisions announced by the Supreme Court of India in May strikingly indicated that the American doctrine of “due process” has firmly become a part of Indian constitutional law, despite the Constitution-framers' contrary intentions. In the first of the two cases, decided on May 5, Selvi v. Karnataka, the court considered the constitutionality of the investigative narco-analysis technique, holding it permissible only when the subject consents to its use. In the second case, decided on May 11, Union of India v. R. Gandhi, a Constitution Bench unanimously held that certain provisions of the Company (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, establishing the National Company Law Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal, suffered from unconstitutional “defects.”
These decisions have been analysed and re-analysed for their immediate policy implications. However, the philosophy underlying these decisions, namely, constitutional “due process,” highlights the paradigm shift in the court's approach to original constitutional norms, and deserves analysis.
The American doctrine of “due process” had been rejected by the framers of the Indian Constitution at the time of its enactment. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the American Constitution provide that life, liberty and property cannot be deprived without “due process of law.” This seemingly innocuous phrase, borrowed, oddly, from per legem terre in the Magna Carta, acquired a nuanced meaning in the American constitutional context, consequent to years of judicial exposition.
Over time, the phrase acquired “substantive” and “procedural” meanings, each of which enhanced the powers of the judiciary. For example, in exercise of powers conferred by the “due process” clause of the Constitution, American courts would create “new” or unenumerated rights. Most notably, these were the rights to abortion, marriage, homosexuality, the use of contraceptives, child-rearing, and so on. The “due process” clause mandated harmonious constitutional interpretation, and enabled American courts to apply federal constitutional standards against the States on principles of “fairness” or “ordered liberty.” Interestingly, in the Magna Carta the phrase “due process of law” was meant to curb the powers of the royal judiciary in favour of the feudal baronage, quite contrary to the spirit of judicial activism that is now attributed to the clause.
 However, despite the express textual choices of the framers of India's Constitution, the “due process” clause found a backdoor entry into Indian constitutional analysis in the late 1970s through the right to equality, which has ever since become a conduit for activist constitutional interpretation. In Justice P.N. Bhagwati's classic opinion in the Maneka Gandhi case, it was held that the Constitution mandates “fair” procedure when rights are deprived. Although the court would repeatedly hold in subsequent cases that the American standard of “due process” did not apply to the Indian Constitution, in reality the court would apply nothing less than due process standards to administrative and legislative authorities in its emphasis on “fair, just and reasonable” procedure.
The two latest decisions of the Supreme Court are striking for their express rejection of the framers' textual value choices. While previous Supreme Court opinions would at least theoretically reject American “due process,” in the narco-analysis case Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan held that “substantive due process” is now a “guarantee” under the Constitution. This declaration is a remarkable rejection of the framers' decision to delete the due process clause. In its narco-analysis opinion, the court upheld a right to mental privacy, recognising an “unenumerated” right as American courts would in exercise of the due process clause.
The right to privacy has been around in Indian constitutional law for decades, and the court's opinion in Selvi merely adds to the existing body of law on constitutional privacy. However, in expressly articulating the “guarantee” of due process, the court has on one of only a few occasions in its history recognised that India follows the due process doctrine, expressly rejecting the framers' intentions.
In R. Gandhi, decided on May 11, the court held that certain provisions of the law regarding the appointment and qualifications of the members of the National Company Law Tribunal, suffered from unconstitutional defects. However, the Indian Constitution does not strictly or textually permit courts to strike down a piece of legislation merely because its provisions are “unfair” or “arbitrary,” in the absence of a violation of one of its enumerated provisions. To overcome this difficulty, the court in this case held that principles such as “independence of the judiciary” are part of the “essence” of the right to equality, and consequently must be enforced. Formerly, principles such as “independence of the judiciary,” “rule of law” and “separation of powers” would usually be applied using the basic structure theory only to constitutional amendments. In its R. Gandhi opinion, the court has remarkably applied loose constitutional principles rooted in its understanding of “fairness” or constitutional “basic structure” to ordinary law, much in the same way as Justice Frankfurter would have done in the American due process cases.
The theory of “original intent,” whose most vociferous proponent, Justice Antonin Scalia, now sits on the American Supreme Court, demands that courts interpret constitutional provisions according to the intention of the framers of the Constitution. In Indian constitutional law, the theory was followed strictly by the court until after its decision in the habeas corpus case, where the Supreme Court followed the framers' intentions and permitted civil liberties to be suspended during the Emergency. The illegitimacy of the court's opinion in the habeas corpus case subsequently offered a sufficient moral basis for the rejection of the theory of original intent. The Supreme Court's latest opinions strike a lethal blow to the theory of original intent, and firmly recognise that constitutional “due process” is here to stay.

Of constitutional ‘due process'

Wednesday, June 2, 2010

Presumption against infringement of Fundamental Rights

 A fundamental right is one explicitly or implicitly implied guaranteed by the constitution.” 
[Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 216 (1984). See also Marshall v. Northern Virginia Transportation Authority, 275 Va. 419, 657 S.E.2d. 71 (2008)]
One can point to other "rules of construction" which require clear and unambiguous words before a statutory provision will be construed as displaying a legislative intent to achieve a particular result. Examples of such "rules" are those relating to the construction of a statute which would abolish or modify fundamental common law principles or rights (see, e.g., Benson v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942) AC 520, at pp 526-527), which would operate retrospectively (see, e.g., Maxwell v. Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261, at p 267), which would deprive a superior court of power to prevent an unauthorized assumption of jurisdiction (see, e.g., Magrath v. Goldsbrough, Mort and Co. Ltd. [1932] HCA 10; (1932) 47 CLR 121, at p 134) or which would take away property without compensation (Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] UKHL 1; (1920) AC 508). The rationale of all such rules lies in an assumption that the legislature would, if it intended to achieve the particular effect, have made its intention in that regard unambiguously clear. Thus, the rationale of the presumption against the modification or abolition of fundamental rights or principles is to be found in the assumption that it is "in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used" (Potter v. Minahan [1908] HCA 63; (1908) 7 CLR 277, at p 304, and see, also, Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates [1925] HCA 53; (1925) 37 CLR 36, at p 93). If such an assumption be shown to be or to have become ill-founded, the foundation upon which the particular presumption rests will necessarily be weakened or removed. Thus, if what was previously accepted as a fundamental principle or fundamental right ceases to be so regarded, the presumption that the legislature would not have intended to depart from that principle or to abolish or modify that right will necessarily be undermined and may well disappear.

BROPHO v. WESTERN AUSTRALIA [1990] HCA 24; (1990) 171 CLR 1, MASON C.J., DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ.
Speaking against the right to access the Courts , that is also a fundamental principle it was observed in House of Lord Decisions following was stated in a case:"Of course, it is well known that Courts of Law have always exercised a certain authority to restrain the abuse of statutory powers. Such powers are not conferred for the private advantage of their holders. They are given for certain limited purposes, which the holders are not entitled to depart from : and if the authority that confers them prescribes, explicitly or by implication, certain conditions as to their exercise, those conditions ought to be adhered to. It is, or may be, an abuse of power not to observe the conditions. It is certainly an abuse of power to seek to exercise it when the statute relied upon does not truly confer it, and the invalidity of the act does not depend in any way upon the question whether the person concerned knows or does not know that he is acting ultra vires. It is an abuse of power to exercise it for a purpose different from that for which it is entrusted to the holder, not the less because he may be acting ostensibly for the authorised purpose. Probably most of the recognised grounds of invalidity could be brought under this head: the introduction of illegitimate considerations, the rejection of legitimate ones, manifest unreason ableness, arbitrary or capricious conduct, the motive of personal advantage or the gratification of personal ill-will. However that may be, an exercise of power in bad faith does not seem to me to have any special pre-eminence of its own among the causes that make for invalidity. It is one of several instances of abuse of power and it may or may not be involved in several of the recognised grounds that I have mentioned. Indeed, I think it plain that the Courts have often been content to allow such circumstances, if established, to speak for themselves rather than to press the issue to a finding that the group of persons responsible for the exercise of the power have actually proceeded in bad faith. [per LORD RADCLIFFE]